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Executive Summary
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has enabled a diverse array of applications across commer-
cial, scientific, and creative domains. With this wave of applications has come a growing awareness of
the large-scale impacts of AI systems, and recognition that existing regulations and norms in industry
and academia are insufficient to ensure responsible AI development [1] [2] [3].
Steps have been taken by the AI community to acknowledge and address this insufficiency, including
widespread adoption of ethics principles by researchers and technology companies. However, ethics
principles are non-binding, and their translation to actions is often not obvious. Furthermore, those
outside a given organization are often ill-equipped to assess whether an AI developer’s actions are con-
sistent with their stated principles. Nor are they able to hold developers to account when principles and
behavior diverge, fueling accusations of "ethics washing" [4]. In order for AI developers to earn trust
from system users, customers, civil society, governments, and other stakeholders that they are building
AI responsibly, there is a need to move beyond principles to a focus on mechanisms for demonstrat-
ing responsible behavior [5]. Making and assessing verifiable claims, to which developers can be held
accountable, is one crucial step in this direction.
With the ability to make precise claims for which evidence can be brought to bear, AI developers canmore
readily demonstrate responsible behavior to regulators, the public, and one another. Greater verifiability
of claims about AI development would help enable more effective oversight and reduce pressure to
cut corners for the sake of gaining a competitive edge [1]. Conversely, without the capacity to verify
claims made by AI developers, those using or affected by AI systems are more likely to be put at risk by
potentially ambiguous, misleading, or false claims.
This report suggests various steps that different stakeholders in AI development can take tomake it easier
to verify claims about AI development, with a focus on providing evidence about the safety, security,
fairness, and privacy protection of AI systems. Implementation of such mechanisms can help make
progress on the multifaceted problem of ensuring that AI development is conducted in a trustworthy
fashion.1 The mechanisms outlined in this report deal with questions that various parties involved in AI
development might face, such as:
• Can I (as a user) verify the claims made about the level of privacy protection guaranteed by a new
AI system I’d like to use for machine translation of sensitive documents?
• Can I (as a regulator) trace the steps that led to an accident caused by an autonomous vehicle?
Against what standards should an autonomous vehicle company’s safety claims be compared?
• Can I (as an academic) conduct impartial research on the impacts associated with large-scale AI
systems when I lack the computing resources of industry?
• Can I (as an AI developer) verify that my competitors in a given area of AI development will follow
best practices rather than cut corners to gain an advantage?
Even AI developers who have the desire and/or incentives to make concrete, verifiable claims may not
be equipped with the appropriate mechanisms to do so. The AI development community needs a ro-
bust "toolbox" of mechanisms to support the verification of claims about AI systems and development
processes.
1The capacity to verify claims made by developers, on its own, would be insufficient to ensure responsible AI development.
Not all important claims admit verification, and there is also a need for oversight agencies such as governments and standards
organizations to align developers’ incentives with the public interest.
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This problem framing led some of the authors of this report to hold a workshop in April 2019, aimed at
expanding the toolbox of mechanisms for making and assessing verifiable claims about AI development.2
This report builds on the ideas proposed at that workshop. The mechanisms outlined do two things:
• They increase the options available to AI developers for substantiating claims they make about AI
systems’ properties.
• They increase the specificity and diversity of demands that can be made of AI developers by other
stakeholders such as users, policymakers, and members of civil society.
Each mechanism and associated recommendation discussed in this report addresses a specific gap pre-
venting effective assessment of developers’ claims today. Some of these mechanisms exist and need to
be extended or scaled up in some way, and others are novel. The report is intended as an incremental
step toward improving the verifiability of claims about AI development.
The report organizes mechanisms under the headings of Institutions, Software, and Hardware, which are
three intertwined components of AI systems and development processes.
• Institutional Mechanisms: These mechanisms shape or clarify the incentives of people involved
in AI development and provide greater visibility into their behavior, including their efforts to en-
sure that AI systems are safe, secure, fair, and privacy-preserving. Institutional mechanisms play a
foundational role in verifiable claims about AI development, since it is people who are ultimately
responsible for AI development. We focus on third party auditing, to create a robust alternative
to self-assessment of claims; red teaming exercises, to demonstrate AI developers’ attention to
the ways in which their systems could be misused; bias and safety bounties, to strengthen incen-
tives to discover and report flaws in AI systems; and sharing of AI incidents, to improve societal
understanding of how AI systems can behave in unexpected or undesired ways.
• Software Mechanisms: These mechanisms enable greater understanding and oversight of specific
AI systems’ properties. We focus on audit trails, to enable accountability for high-stakes AI systems
by capturing critical information about the development and deployment process; interpretabil-
ity, to foster understanding and scrutiny of AI systems’ characteristics; and privacy-preserving
machine learning, to make developers’ commitments to privacy protection more robust.
• Hardware Mechanisms: Mechanisms related to computing hardware can play a key role in sub-
stantiating strong claims about privacy and security, enabling transparency about how an orga-
nization’s resources are put to use, and influencing who has the resources necessary to verify
different claims. We focus on secure hardware for machine learning, to increase the verifiabil-
ity of privacy and security claims; high-precision compute measurement, to improve the value
and comparability of claims about computing power usage; and compute support for academia,
to improve the ability of those outside of industry to evaluate claims about large-scale AI systems.
Each mechanism provides additional paths to verifying AI developers’ commitments to responsible AI
development, and has the potential to contribute to a more trustworthy AI ecosystem. The full list of
recommendations associated with each mechanism is found on the following page and again at the end
of the report.
2See Appendix I, "Workshop and Report Writing Process."
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List of Recommendations
Institutional Mechanisms and Recommendations
1. A coalition of stakeholders should create a task force to research options for conducting and fund-
ing third party auditing of AI systems.
2. Organizations developing AI should run red teaming exercises to explore risks associated with
systems they develop, and should share best practices and tools for doing so.
3. AI developers should pilot bias and safety bounties for AI systems to strengthen incentives and
processes for broad-based scrutiny of AI systems.
4. AI developers should share more information about AI incidents, including through collaborative
channels.
Software Mechanisms and Recommendations
5. Standards setting bodies should work with academia and industry to develop audit trail require-
ments for safety-critical applications of AI systems.
6. Organizations developing AI and funding bodies should support research into the interpretability
of AI systems, with a focus on supporting risk assessment and auditing.
7. AI developers should develop, share, and use suites of tools for privacy-preserving machine
learning that include measures of performance against common standards.
Hardware Mechanisms and Recommendations
8. Industry and academia should work together to develop hardware security features for AI ac-
celerators or otherwise establish best practices for the use of secure hardware (including secure
enclaves on commodity hardware) in machine learning contexts.
9. One or more AI labs should estimate the computing power involved in a single project in great
detail (high-precision compute measurement), and report on the potential for wider adoption
of such methods.
10. Government funding bodies should substantially increase funding of computing power resources
for researchers in academia, in order to improve the ability of those researchers to verify claims
made by industry.
3
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With rapid technical progress in artificial intelligence (AI)3 and the spread of AI-based applications
over the past several years, there is growing concern about how to ensure that the development and
deployment of AI is beneficial – and not detrimental – to humanity. In recent years, AI systems have
been developed in ways that are inconsistent with the stated values of those developing them. This
has led to a rise in concern, research, and activism relating to the impacts of AI systems [2] [3]. AI
development has raised concerns about amplification of bias [6], loss of privacy [7], digital addictions
[8], social harms associated with facial recognition and criminal risk assessment [9], disinformation
[10], and harmful changes to the quality [11] and availability of gainful employment [12].
In response to these concerns, a range of stakeholders, including those developing AI systems, have
articulated ethics principles to guide responsible AI development. The amount of work undertaken to
articulate and debate such principles is encouraging, as is the convergence of many such principles on a
set of widely-shared concerns such as safety, security, fairness, and privacy.4
However, principles are only a first step in the effort to ensure beneficial societal outcomes from AI
[13]. Indeed, studies [17], surveys [18], and trends in worker and community organizing [2] [3] make
clear that large swaths of the public are concerned about the risks of AI development, and do not trust
the organizations currently dominating such development to self-regulate effectively. Those potentially
affected by AI systems need mechanisms for ensuring responsible development that are more robust
than high-level principles. People who get on airplanes don’t trust an airline manufacturer because of its
PR campaigns about the importance of safety - they trust it because of the accompanying infrastructure
of technologies, norms, laws, and institutions for ensuring airline safety.5 Similarly, along with the
growing explicit adoption of ethics principles to guide AI development, there is mounting skepticism
about whether these claims and commitments can be monitored and enforced [19].
Policymakers are beginning to enact regulations that more directly constrain AI developers’ behavior
[20]. We believe that analyzing AI development through the lens of verifiable claims can help to inform
such efforts. AI developers, regulators, and other actors all need to understand which properties of AI
systems and development processes can be credibly demonstrated, through what means, and with what
tradeoffs.
We define verifiable claims6 as falsifiable statements for which evidence and arguments can be brought
3We define AI as digital systems that are capable of performing tasks commonly thought to require intelligence, with these
tasks typically learned via data and/or experience.
4Note, however, that many such principles have been articulated byWestern academics and technology company employees,
and as such are not necessarily representative of humanity’s interests or values as a whole. Further, they are amenable to various
interpretations [13][14] and agreement on them can mask deeper disagreements [5]. See also Beijing AI Principles [15] and
Zeng et. al. [16] for examples of non-Western AI principles.
5Recent commercial airline crashes also serve as a reminder that even seemingly robust versions of such infrastructure are
imperfect and in need of constant vigilance.
6While this report does discuss the technical area of formal verification at several points, and several of our recommendations
are based on best practices from the field of information security, the sense in which we use "verifiable" is distinct from how
the term is used in those contexts. Unless otherwise specified by the use of the adjective "formal" or other context, this report
uses the word verification in a looser sense. Formal verification seeks mathematical proof that a certain technical claim is
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to bear on the likelihood of those claims being true. While the degree of attainable certainty will vary
across different claims and contexts, we hope to show that greater degrees of evidence can be provided
for claims about AI development than is typical today. The nature and importance of verifiable claims
is discussed in greater depth in Appendix III, and we turn next to considering the types of mechanisms
that can make claims verifiable.
1.2 Institutional, Software, and Hardware Mechanisms
AI developers today have many possible approaches for increasing the verifiability of their claims. De-
spite the availability of many mechanisms that could help AI developers demonstrate their claims and
help other stakeholders scrutinize their claims, this toolbox has not been well articulated to date.
We view AI development processes as sociotechnical systems,7 with institutions, software, and hardware
all potentially supporting (or detracting from) the verifiability of claims about AI development. AI de-
velopers can make claims about, or take actions related to, each of these three interrelated pillars of AI
development.
In some cases, adopting one of these mechanisms can increase the verifiability of one’s own claims,
whereas in other cases the impact on trust is more indirect (i.e., a mechanism implemented by one actor
enabling greater scrutiny of other actors). As such, collaboration across sectors and organizations will be
critical in order to build an ecosystem in which claims about responsible AI development can be verified.
• Institutional mechanisms largely pertain to values, incentives, and accountability. Institutional
mechanisms shape or clarify the incentives of people involved in AI development and provide
greater visibility into their behavior, including their efforts to ensure that AI systems are safe, se-
cure, fair, and privacy-preserving. These mechanisms can also create or strengthen channels for
holding AI developers accountable for harms associated with AI development. In this report, we
provide an overview of some such mechanisms, and then discuss third party auditing, red team
exercises, safety and bias bounties, and sharing of AI incidents in more detail.
• Software mechanisms largely pertain to specific AI systems and their properties. Software mecha-
nisms can be used to provide evidence for both formal and informal claims regarding the properties
of specific AI systems, enabling greater understanding and oversight. The software mechanisms
we highlight below are audit trails, interpretability, and privacy-preserving machine learning.
• Hardware mechanisms largely pertain to physical computational resources and their properties.
Hardware mechanisms can support verifiable claims by providing greater assurance regarding the
privacy and security of AI systems, and can be used to substantiate claims about how an organi-
zation is using their general-purpose computing capabilities. Further, the distribution of resources
across different actors can influence the types of AI systems that are developed and which ac-
tors are capable of assessing other actors’ claims (including by reproducing them). The hardware
mechanisms we focus on in this report are hardware security features for machine learning,
high-precision compute measurement, and computing power support for academia.
true with certainty (subject to certain assumptions). In contrast, this report largely focuses on claims that are unlikely to be
demonstrated with absolute certainty, but which can be shown to be likely or unlikely to be true through relevant arguments
and evidence.
7Broadly, a sociotechnical system is one whose "core interface consists of the relations between a nonhuman system and a
human system", rather than the components of those systems in isolation. See Trist [21].
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1.3 Scope and Limitations
This report focuses on a particular aspect of trustworthy AI development: the extent to which organiza-
tions developing AI systems can and do make verifiable claims about the AI systems they build, and the
ability of other parties to assess those claims. Given the backgrounds of the authors, the report focuses
in particular on mechanisms for demonstrating claims about AI systems being safe, secure, fair, and/or
privacy-preserving, without implying that those are the only sorts of claims that need to be verified.
We devote particular attention to mechanisms8 that the authors have expertise in and for which concrete
and beneficial next steps were identified at an April 2019 workshop. These are not the only mechanisms
relevant to verifiable claims; we survey some others at the beginning of each section, and expect that
further useful mechanisms have yet to be identified.
Making verifiable claims is part of, but not equivalent to, trustworthy AI development, broadly defined.
An AI developer might also be more or less trustworthy based on the particular values they espouse, the
extent to which they engage affected communities in their decision-making, or the extent of recourse
that they provide to external parties who are affected by their actions. Additionally, the actions of AI
developers, which we focus on, are not all that matters for trustworthy AI development–the existence
and enforcement of relevant laws matters greatly, for example.
Appendix I discusses the reasons for the report’s scope in more detail, and Appendix II discusses the
relationship between different definitions of trust and verifiable claims. When we use the term "trust"
as a verb in the report, we mean that one party (party A) gains confidence in the reliability of another
party’s claims (party B) based on evidence provided about the accuracy of those claims or related ones.
We also make reference to this claim-oriented sense of trust when we discuss actors "earning" trust,
(providing evidence for claims made), or being "trustworthy" (routinely providing sufficient evidence
for claims made). This use of language is intended to concisely reference an important dimension of
trustworthy AI development, and is not meant to imply that verifiable claims are sufficient for attaining
trustworthy AI development.
1.4 Outline of the Report
The next three sections of the report, Institutional Mechanisms and Recommendations, Software
Mechanisms and Recommendations, and Hardware Mechanisms and Recommendations, each be-
gin with a survey of mechanisms relevant to that category. Each section then highlights several mech-
anisms that we consider especially promising. We are uncertain which claims are most important to
verify in the context of AI development, but strongly suspect that some combination of the mechanisms
we outline in this report are needed to craft an AI ecosystem in which responsible AI development can
flourish.
The way we articulate the case for each mechanism is problem-centric: each mechanism helps address
a potential barrier to claim verification identified by the authors. Depending on the case, the recom-
mendations associated with each mechanism are aimed at implementing a mechanism for the first time,
researching it, scaling it up, or extending it in some way.
8We use the term mechanism generically to refer to processes, systems, or approaches for providing or generating evidence
about behavior.
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The Conclusion puts the report in context, discusses some important caveats, and reflects on next steps.
The Appendices provide important context, supporting material, and supplemental analysis. Appendix
I provides background on the workshop and the process that went into writing the report; Appendix II
serves as a glossary and discussion of key terms used in the report; Appendix III discusses the nature
and importance of verifiable claims; Appendix IV discusses the importance of verifiable claims in the
context of arms control; Appendix V provides context on antitrust law as it relates to cooperation among
AI developers on responsible AI development; and Appendix VI offers supplemental analysis of several
mechanisms.
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2 Institutional Mechanisms and Recommendations
"Institutional mechanisms" are processes that shape or clarify the incentives of the people involved in
AI development, make their behavior more transparent, or enable accountability for their behavior.
Institutional mechanisms help to ensure that individuals or organizations making claims regarding AI
development are incentivized to be diligent in developing AI responsibly and that other stakeholders can
verify that behavior. Institutions9 can shape incentives or constrain behavior in various ways.
Several clusters of existing institutional mechanisms are relevant to responsible AI development, and
we characterize some of their roles and limitations below. These provide a foundation for the subse-
quent, more detailed discussion of several mechanisms and associated recommendations. Specifically,
we provide an overview of some existing institutional mechanisms that have the following functions:
• Clarifying organizational goals and values;
• Increasing transparency regarding AI development processes;
• Creating incentives for developers to act in ways that are responsible; and
• Fostering exchange of information among developers.
Institutional mechanisms can help clarify an organization’s goals and values, which in turn can pro-
vide a basis for evaluating their claims. These statements of goals and values–which can also be viewed
as (high level) claims in the framework discussed here–can help to contextualize the actions an orga-
nization takes and lay the foundation for others (shareholders, employees, civil society organizations,
governments, etc.) to monitor and evaluate behavior. Over 80 AI organizations [5], including technol-
ogy companies such as Google [22], OpenAI [23], and Microsoft [24] have publicly stated the principles
they will follow in developing AI. Codes of ethics or conduct are far from sufficient, since they are typ-
ically abstracted away from particular cases and are not reliably enforced, but they can be valuable by
establishing criteria that a developer concedes are appropriate for evaluating its behavior.
The creation and public announcement of a code of ethics proclaims an organization’s commitment to
ethical conduct both externally to the wider public, as well as internally to its employees, boards, and
shareholders. Codes of conduct differ from codes of ethics in that they contain a set of concrete behavioral
standards.10
Institutional mechanisms can increase transparency regarding an organization’s AI development
processes in order to permit others to more easily verify compliance with appropriate norms, regula-
tions, or agreements. Improved transparency may reveal the extent to which actions taken by an AI
developer are consistent with their declared intentions and goals. The more reliable, timely, and com-
plete the institutional measures to enhance transparency are, the more assurance may be provided.
9Institutions may be formal and public institutions, such as: laws, courts, and regulatory agencies; private formal ar-
rangements between parties, such as contracts; interorganizational structures such as industry associations, strategic alliances,
partnerships, coalitions, joint ventures, and research consortia. Institutions may also be informal norms and practices that
prescribe behaviors in particular contexts; or third party organizations, such as professional bodies and academic institutions.
10Many organizations use the terms synonymously. The specificity of codes of ethics can vary, and more specific (i.e., action-
guiding) codes of ethics (i.e. those equivalent to codes of conduct) can be better for earning trust because they are more
falsifiable. Additionally, the form and content of these mechanisms can evolve over time–consider, e.g., Google’s AI Principles,
which have been incrementally supplemented with more concrete guidance in particular areas.
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Transparency measures could be undertaken on a voluntary basis or as part of an agreed framework
involving relevant parties (such as a consortium of AI developers, interested non-profits, or policymak-
ers). For example, algorithmic impact assessments are intended to support affected communities and
stakeholders in assessing AI and other automated decision systems [2]. The Canadian government, for
example, has centered AIAs in its Directive on Automated Decision-Making [25] [26]. Another path
toward greater transparency around AI development involves increasing the extent and quality of docu-
mentation for AI systems. Such documentation can help foster informed and safe use of AI systems by
providing information about AI systems’ biases and other attributes [27][28][29].
Institutional mechanisms can create incentives for organizations to act in ways that are responsible.
Incentives can be created within an organization or externally, and they can operate at an organizational
or an individual level. The incentives facing an actor can provide evidence regarding how that actor will
behave in the future, potentially bolstering the credibility of related claims. To modify incentives at an
organizational level, organizations can choose to adopt different organizational structures (such as benefit
corporations) or take on legally binding intra-organizational commitments. For example, organizations
could credibly commit to distributing the benefits of AI broadly through a legal commitment that shifts
fiduciary duties.11
Institutional commitments to such steps could make a particular organization’s financial incentives more
clearly aligned with the public interest. To the extent that commitments to responsible AI development
and distribution of benefits are widely implemented, AI developers would stand to benefit from each
others’ success, potentially12 reducing incentives to race against one another [1]. And critically, gov-
ernment regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) enacted by the European
Union shift developer incentives by imposing penalties on developers that do not adequately protect
privacy or provide recourse for algorithmic decision-making.
Finally, institutional mechanisms can foster exchange of information between developers. To avoid
"races to the bottom" in AI development, AI developers can exchange lessons learned and demonstrate
their compliance with relevant norms to one another. Multilateral fora (in addition to bilateral conversa-
tions between organizations) provide opportunities for discussion and repeated interaction, increasing
transparency and interpersonal understanding. Voluntary membership organizations with stricter rules
and norms have been implemented in other industries andmight also be a useful model for AI developers
[31].13
Steps in the direction of robust information exchange between AI developers include the creation of
consensus around important priorities such as safety, security, privacy, and fairness;14 participation in
multi-stakeholder fora such as the Partnership on Artificial Intelligence to Benefit People and Society
(PAI), the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics En-
gineers (IEEE), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the International Standards
Organization (ISO); and clear identification of roles or offices within organizations who are responsible
11The Windfall Clause [30] is one proposal along these lines, and involves an ex ante commitment by AI firms to donate a
significant amount of any eventual extremely large profits.
12The global nature of AI development, and the national nature of much relevant regulation, is a key complicating factor.
13See for example the norms set and enforced by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). These norms
have real "teeth," such as the obligation for designated holders of Standard Essential Patents to license on Fair, Reasonable and
Non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Breach of FRAND could give rise to a breach of contract claim as well as constitute a
breach of antitrust law [32]. Voluntary standards for consumer products, such as those associated with Fairtrade and Organic
labels, are also potentially relevant precedents [33].
14An example of such an effort is the Asilomar AI Principles [34].
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for maintaining and deepening interorganizational communication [10].15
It is also important to examine the incentives (and disincentives) for free flow of information within
an organization. Employees within organizations developing AI systems can play an important role in
identifying unethical or unsafe practices. For this to succeed, employees must be well-informed about
the scope of AI development efforts within their organization and be comfortable raising their concerns,
and such concerns need to be taken seriously by management.16 Policies (whether governmental or
organizational) that help ensure safe channels for expressing concerns are thus key foundations for
verifying claims about AI development being conducted responsibly.
The subsections below each introduce and explore a mechanism with the potential for improving the
verifiability of claims in AI development: third party auditing, red team exercises, bias and safety
bounties, and sharing of AI incidents. In each case, the subsections below begin by discussing a
problem which motivates exploration of that mechanism, followed by a recommendation for improving
or applying that mechanism.
15Though note competitors sharing commercially sensitive, non-public information (such as strategic plans or R&D plans)
could raise antitrust concerns. It is therefore important to have the right antitrust governance structures and procedures in
place (i.e., setting out exactly what can and cannot be shared). See Appendix V.
16Recent revelations regarding the culture of engineering and management at Boeing highlight the urgency of this issue
[35].
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2.1 Third Party Auditing
Problem:
The process of AI development is often opaque to those outside a given organization, and
various barriers make it challenging for third parties to verify the claims being made by a
developer. As a result, claims about system attributes may not be easily verified.
AI developers have justifiable concerns about being transparent with information concerning commercial
secrets, personal information, or AI systems that could be misused; however, problems arise when these
concerns incentivize them to evade scrutiny. Third party auditors can be given privileged and secured
access to this private information, and they can be tasked with assessing whether safety, security, privacy,
and fairness-related claims made by the AI developer are accurate.
Auditing is a structured process by which an organization’s present or past behavior is assessed for
consistency with relevant principles, regulations, or norms. Auditing has promoted consistency and
accountability in industries outside of AI such as finance and air travel. In each case, auditing is tailored
to the evolving nature of the industry in question.17 Recently, auditing has gained traction as a potential
paradigm for assessing whether AI development was conducted in a manner consistent with the stated
principles of an organization, with valuable work focused on designing internal auditing processes (i.e.
those in which the auditors are also employed by the organization being audited) [36].
Third party auditing is a form of auditing conducted by an external and independent auditor, rather
than the organization being audited, and can help address concerns about the incentives for accuracy
in self-reporting. Provided that they have sufficient information about the activities of an AI system, in-
dependent auditors with strong reputational and professional incentives for truthfulness can help verify
claims about AI development.
Auditing could take at least four quite different forms, and likely further variations are possible: auditing
by an independent body with government-backed policing and sanctioning power; auditing that occurs
entirely within the context of a government, though with multiple agencies involved [37]; auditing by
a private expert organization or some ensemble of such organizations; and internal auditing followed
by public disclosure of (some subset of) the results.18 As commonly occurs in other contexts, the re-
sults produced by independent auditors might be made publicly available, to increase confidence in the
propriety of the auditing process.19
Techniques and best practices have not yet been established for auditing AI systems. Outside of AI,
however, there are well-developed frameworks on which to build. Outcomes- or claim-based "assurance
frameworks" such as the Claims-Arguments-Evidence framework (CAE) and Goal Structuring Notation
(GSN) are already in wide use in safety-critical auditing contexts.20 By allowing different types of ar-
guments and evidence to be used appropriately by auditors, these frameworks provide considerable
flexibility in how high-level claims are substantiated, a needed feature given the wide ranging and fast-
17See Raji and Smart et al. [36] for a discussion of some lessons for AI from auditing in other industries.
18Model cards for model reporting [28] and data sheets for datasets [29] reveal information about AI systems publicly, and
future work in third party auditing could build on such tools, as advocated by Raji and Smart et al. [36].
19Consumer Reports, originally founded as the Consumers Union in 1936, is one model for an independent, third party
organization that performs similar functions for products that can affect the health, well-being, and safety of the people using
those products. (https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/about-us/what-we-do/research-and-testing/index.htm).
20See Appendix III for further discussion of claim-based frameworks for auditing.
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evolving societal challenges posed by AI.
Possible aspects of AI systems that could be independently audited include the level of privacy protection
guaranteed, the extent to (and methods by) which the AI systems were tested for safety, security or
ethical concerns, and the sources of data, labor, and other resources used. Third party auditing could
be applicable to a wide range of AI applications, as well. Safety-critical AI systems such as autonomous
vehicles and medical AI systems, for example, could be audited for safety and security. Such audits
could confirm or refute the accuracy of previous claims made by developers, or compare their efforts
against an independent set of standards for safety and security. As another example, search engines and
recommendation systems could be independently audited for harmful biases.
Third party auditors should be held accountable by government, civil society, and other stakeholders
to ensure that strong incentives exist to act accurately and fairly. Reputational considerations help to
ensure auditing integrity in the case of financial accounting, where firms prefer to engage with credible
auditors [38]. Alternatively, a licensing system could be implemented in which auditors undergo a
standard training process in order to become a licensed AI system auditor. However, given the variety
of methods and applications in the field of AI, it is not obvious whether auditor licensing is a feasible
option for the industry: perhaps a narrower form of licensing would be helpful (e.g., a subset of AI such
as adversarial machine learning).
Auditing imposes costs (financial and otherwise) that must be weighed against its value. Even if auditing
is broadly societally beneficial and non-financial costs (e.g., to intellectual property) are managed, the
financial costs will need to be borne by someone (auditees, large actors in the industry, taxpayers, etc.),
raising the question of how to initiate a self-sustaining process by which third party auditing couldmature
and scale. However, if done well, third party auditing could strengthen the ability of stakeholders in the
AI ecosystem to make and assess verifiable claims. And notably, the insights gained from third party
auditing could be shared widely, potentially benefiting stakeholders even in countries with different
regulatory approaches for AI.
Recommendation: A coalition of stakeholders should create a task force to research options for
conducting and funding third party auditing of AI systems.
AI developers and other stakeholders (such as civil society organizations and policymakers) should col-
laboratively explore the challenges associated with third party auditing. A task force focused on this
issue could explore appropriate initial domains/applications to audit, devise approaches for handling
sensitive intellectual property, and balance the need for standardization with the need for flexibility as
AI technology evolves.21 Collaborative research into this domain seems especially promising given that
the same auditing process could be used across labs and countries. As research in these areas evolves, so
too will auditing processes–one might thus think of auditing as a "meta-mechanism" which could involve
assessing the quality of other efforts discussed in this report such as red teaming.
One way that third party auditing could connect to government policies, and be funded, is via a "regu-
latory market" [42]. In a regulatory market for AI, a government would establish high-level outcomes
to be achieved from regulation of AI (e.g., achievement of a certain level of safety in an industry) and
then create or support private sector entities or other organizations that compete in order to design and
implement the precise technical oversight required to achieve those outcomes.22 Regardless of whether
such an approach is pursued, third party auditing by private actors should be viewed as a complement
21This list is not exhaustive - see, e.g., [39], [40], and [41] for related discussions.
22Examples of such entities include EXIDA, the UK Office of Nuclear Regulation, and the private company Adelard.
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to, rather than a substitute, for governmental regulation. And regardless of the entity conducting over-
sight of AI developers, in any case there will be a need to grapple with difficult challenges such as the
treatment of proprietary data.
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2.2 Red Team Exercises
Problem:
It is difficult for AI developers to address the "unknown unknowns" associated with AI systems,
including limitations and risks that might be exploited by malicious actors. Further, existing
red teaming approaches are insufficient for addressing these concerns in the AI context.
In order for AI developers to make verifiable claims about their AI systems being safe or secure, they need
processes for surfacing and addressing potential safety and security risks. Practices such as red teaming
exercises help organizations to discover their own limitations and vulnerabilities as well as those of the
AI systems they develop, and to approach them holistically, in a way that takes into account the larger
environment in which they are operating.23
A red team exercise is a structured effort to find flaws and vulnerabilities in a plan, organization, or
technical system, often performed by dedicated "red teams" that seek to adopt an attacker’s mindset
and methods. In domains such as computer security, red teams are routinely tasked with emulating
attackers in order to find flaws and vulnerabilities in organizations and their systems. Discoveries made
by red teams allow organizations to improve security and system integrity before and during deployment.
Knowledge that a lab has a red team can potentially improve the trustworthiness of an organization with
respect to their safety and security claims, at least to the extent that effective red teaming practices exist
and are demonstrably employed.
As indicated by the number of cases in which AI systems cause or threaten to cause harm, developers of an
AI system often fail to anticipate the potential risks associated with technical systems they develop. These
risks include both inadvertent failures and deliberate misuse. Those not involved in the development
of a particular system may be able to more easily adopt and practice an attacker’s skillset. A growing
number of industry labs have dedicated red teams, although best practices for such efforts are generally
in their early stages.24 There is a need for experimentation both within and across organizations in order
to move red teaming in AI forward, especially since few AI developers have expertise in relevant areas
such as threat modeling and adversarial machine learning [44].
AI systems and infrastructure vary substantially in terms of their properties and risks, making in-house
red-teaming expertise valuable for organizations with sufficient resources. However, it would also be
beneficial to experiment with the formation of a community of AI red teaming professionals that draws
together individuals from different organizations and backgrounds, specifically focused on some subset
of AI (versus AI in general) that is relatively well-defined and relevant across multiple organizations.25
A community of red teaming professionals could take actions such as publish best practices, collectively
analyze particular case studies, organize workshops on emerging issues, or advocate for policies that
would enable red teaming to be more effective.
Doing red teaming in a more collaborative fashion, as a community of focused professionals across
23Red teaming could be aimed at assessing various properties of AI systems, though we focus on safety and security in this
subsection given the expertise of the authors who contributed to it.
24For an example of early efforts related to this, see Marshall et al., "Threat Modeling AI/ML Systems and Dependencies"
[43]
25In the context of languagemodels, for example, 2019 saw a degree of communication and coordination across AI developers
to assess the relative risks of different language understanding and generation systems [10]. Adversarial machine learning,
too, is an area with substantial sharing of lessons across organizations, though it is not obvious whether a shared red team
focused on this would be too broad.
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organizations, has several potential benefits:
• Participants in such a community would gain useful, broad knowledge about the AI ecosystem,
allowing them to identify common attack vectors and make periodic ecosystem-wide recommen-
dations to organizations that are not directly participating in the core community;
• Collaborative red teaming distributes the costs for such a team across AI developers, allowing those
who otherwise may not have utilized a red team of similarly high quality or one at all to access its
benefits (e.g., smaller organizations with less resources);
• Greater collaboration could facilitate sharing of information about security-related AI incidents.26
Recommendation: Organizations developing AI should run red teaming exercises to explore risks
associated with systems they develop, and should share best practices and tools for doing so.
Two critical questions that would need to be answered in the context of forming a more cohesive AI
red teaming community are: what is the appropriate scope of such a group, and how will proprietary
information be handled?27 The two questions are related. Particularly competitive contexts (e.g., au-
tonomous vehicles) might be simultaneously very appealing and challenging: multiple parties stand to
gain from pooling of insights, but collaborative red teaming in such contexts is also challenging because
of intellectual property and security concerns.
As an alternative to or supplement to explicitly collaborative red teaming, organizations building AI
technologies should establish shared resources and outlets for sharing relevant non-proprietary infor-
mation. The subsection on sharing of AI incidents also discusses some potential innovations that could
alleviate concerns around sharing proprietary information.
26This has a precedent from cybersecurity; MITRE’s ATT&CK is a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and
techniques based on real-world observations, which serves as a foundation for development of more specific threat models and
methodologies to improve cybersecurity (https://attack.mitre.org/).
27These practical questions are not exhaustive, and even addressing them effectively might not suffice to ensure that col-
laborative red teaming is beneficial. For example, one potential failure mode is if collaborative red teaming fostered excessive
homogeneity in the red teaming approaches used, contributing to a false sense of security in cases where that approach is
insufficient.
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2.3 Bias and Safety Bounties
Problem:
There is too little incentive, and no formal process, for individuals unaffiliated with a particular
AI developer to seek out and report problems of AI bias and safety. As a result, broad-based
scrutiny of AI systems for these properties is relatively rare.
"Bug bounty" programs have been popularized in the information security industry as a way to compen-
sate individuals for recognizing and reporting bugs, especially those related to exploits and vulnerabil-
ities [45]. Bug bounties provide a legal and compelling way to report bugs directly to the institutions
affected, rather than exposing the bugs publicly or selling the bugs to others. Typically, bug bounties
involve an articulation of the scale and severity of the bugs in order to determine appropriate compen-
sation.
While efforts such as red teaming are focused on bringing internal resources to bear on identifying risks
associated with AI systems, bounty programs give outside individuals a method for raising concerns
about specific AI systems in a formalized way. Bounties provide one way to increase the amount of
scrutiny applied to AI systems, increasing the likelihood of claims about those systems being verified or
refuted.
Bias28 and safety bounties would extend the bug bounty concept to AI, and could complement existing
efforts to better document datasets and models for their performance limitations and other properties.29
We focus here on bounties for discovering bias and safety issues in AI systems as a starting point for
analysis and experimentation, but note that bounties for other properties (such as security, privacy pro-
tection, or interpretability) could also be explored.30
While some instances of bias are easier to identify, others can only be uncovered with significant analysis
and resources. For example, Ziad Obermeyer et al. uncovered racial bias in a widely used algorithm
affecting millions of patients [47]. There have also been several instances of consumers with no direct
access to AI institutions using social media and the press to draw attention to problems with AI [48]. To
date, investigative journalists and civil society organizations have played key roles in surfacing different
biases in deployed AI systems. If companies were more open earlier in the development process about
possible faults, and if users were able to raise (and be compensated for raising) concerns about AI to
institutions, users might report them directly instead of seeking recourse in the court of public opinion.31
In addition to bias, bounties could also add value in the context of claims about AI safety. Algorithms or
models that are purported to have favorable safety properties, such as enabling safe exploration or ro-
bustness to distributional shifts [49], could be scrutinized via bounty programs. To date, more attention
has been paid to documentation of models for bias properties than safety properties,32 though in both
28For an earlier exploration of bias bounties by one of the report authors, see Rubinovitz [46].
29For example, model cards for model reporting [28] and datasheets for datasets [29] are recently developed means of
documenting AI releases, and such documentation could be extended with publicly listed incentives for finding new forms of
problematic behavior not captured in that documentation.
30Bounties for finding issues with datasets used for training AI systems could also be considered, though we focus on trained
AI systems and code as starting points.
31We note that many millions of dollars have been paid to date via bug bounty programs in the computer security domain,
providing some evidence for this hypothesis. However, bug bounties are not a panacea and recourse to the public is also
appropriate in some cases.
32We also note that the challenge of avoiding harmful biases is sometimes framed as a subset of safety, though for the
16
cases, benchmarks remain in an early state. Improved safety metrics could increase the comparability
of bounty programs and the overall robustness of the bounty ecosystem; however, there should also be
means of reporting issues that are not well captured by existing metrics.
Note that bounties are not sufficient for ensuring that a system is safe, secure, or fair, and it is important
to avoid creating perverse incentives (e.g., encouraging work on poorly-specified bounties and thereby
negatively affecting talent pipelines) [50]. Some system properties can be difficult to discover even with
bounties, and the bounty hunting community might be too small to create strong assurances. However,
relative to the status quo, bounties might increase the amount of scrutiny applied to AI systems.
Recommendation: AI developers should pilot bias and safety bounties for AI systems to strengthen
incentives and processes for broad-based scrutiny of AI systems.
Issues to be addressed in setting up such a bounty program include [46]:
• Setting compensation rates for different scales/severities of issues discovered;
• Determining processes for soliciting and evaluating bounty submissions;
• Developing processes for disclosing issues discovered via such bounties in a timely fashion;33
• Designing appropriate interfaces for reporting of bias and safety problems in the context of de-
ployed AI systems;
• Defining processes for handling reported bugs and deploying fixes;
• Avoiding creation of perverse incentives.
There is not a perfect analogy between discovering and addressing traditional computer security vul-
nerabilities, on the one hand, and identifying and addressing limitations in AI systems, on the other.
Work is thus needed to explore the factors listed above in order to adapt the bug bounty concept to
the context of AI development. The computer security community has developed norms (though not a
consensus) regarding how to address "zero day" vulnerabilities,34 but no comparable norms yet exist in
the AI community.
There may be a need for distinct approaches to different types of vulnerabilities and associated bounties,
depending on factors such as the potential for remediation of the issue and the stakes associated with the
AI system. Bias might be treated differently from safety issues such as unsafe exploration, as these have
distinct causes, risks, and remediation steps. In some contexts, a bounty might be paid for information
even if there is no ready fix to the identified issue, because providing accurate documentation to system
users is valuable in and of itself and there is often no pretense of AI systems being fully robust. In other
purposes of this discussion, little hinges on this terminological issue. We distinguish the two in the title of this section in order
to call attention to the unique properties of different types of bounties.
33Note that we specifically consider public bounty programs here, though instances of private bounty programs also exist
in the computer security community. Even in the event of a publicly advertised bounty, however, submissions may be private,
and as such there is a need for explicit policies for handling submissions in a timely and legitimate fashion–otherwise such
programs will provide little assurance.
34A zero-day vulnerability is a security vulnerability that is unknown to the developers of the system and other affected
parties, giving them "zero days" to mitigate the issue if the vulnerability were to immediately become widely known. The
computer security community features a range of views on appropriate responses to zero-days, with a common approach being
to provide a finite period for the vendor to respond to notification of the vulnerability before the discoverer goes public.
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cases, more care will be needed in responding to the identified issue, such as when a model is widely
used in deployed products and services.
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2.4 Sharing of AI Incidents
Problem:
Claims about AI systems can be scrutinized more effectively if there is common knowledge of
the potential risks of such systems. However, cases of desired or unexpected behavior by AI
systems are infrequently shared since it is costly to do unilaterally.
Organizations can share AI "incidents," or cases of undesired or unexpected behavior by an AI system
that causes or could cause harm, by publishing case studies about these incidents from which others can
learn. This can be accompanied by information about how they have worked to prevent future incidents
based on their own and others’ experiences.
By default, organizations developing AI have an incentive to primarily or exclusively report positive
outcomes associated with their work rather than incidents. As a result, a skewed image is given to the
public, regulators, and users about the potential risks associated with AI development.
The sharing of AI incidents can improve the verifiability of claims in AI development by highlighting
risks that might not have otherwise been considered by certain actors. Knowledge of these risks, in turn,
can then be used to inform questions posed to AI developers, increasing the effectiveness of external
scrutiny. Incident sharing can also (over time, if used regularly) provide evidence that incidents are
found and acknowledged by particular organizations, though additional mechanisms would be needed
to demonstrate the completeness of such sharing.
AI incidents can include those that are publicly known and transparent, publicly known and anonymized,
privately known and anonymized, or privately known and transparent. The Partnership on AI has begun
building an AI incident-sharing database, called the AI Incident Database.35 The pilot was built using
publicly available information through a set of volunteers and contractors manually collecting known AI
incidents where AI caused harm in the real world.
Improving the ability and incentive of AI developers to report incidents requires building additional
infrastructure, analogous to the infrastructure that exists for reporting incidents in other domains such
as cybersecurity. Infrastructure to support incident sharing that involves non-public information would
require the following resources:
• Transparent and robust processes to protect organizations from undue reputational harm brought
about by the publication of previously unshared incidents. This could be achieved by anonymizing
incident information to protect the identity of the organization sharing it. Other information-
sharing methods should be explored that would mitigate reputational risk to organizations, while
preserving the usefulness of information shared;
• A trusted neutral third party that works with each organization under a non-disclosure agreement
to collect and anonymize private information;
35See Partnership on AI’s AI Incident Registry as an example (http://aiid.partnershiponai.org/). A related resource is a list
called Awful AI, which is intended to raise awareness of misuses of AI and to spur discussion around contestational research
and tech projects [51]. A separate list summarizes various cases in which AI systems "gamed" their specifications in unexpected
ways [52]. Additionally, AI developers have in some cases provided retrospective analyses of particular AI incidents, such as
with Microsoft’s "Tay" chatbot [53].
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• An organization that maintains and administers an online platform where users can easily access
the incident database, including strong encryption and password protection for private incidents
as well as a way to submit new information. This organization would not have to be the same as
the third party that collects and anonymizes private incident data;
• Resources and channels to publicize the existence of this database as a centralized resource, to ac-
celerate both contributions to the database and positive uses of the knowledge from the database;
and
• Dedicated researchers who monitor incidents in the database in order to identify patterns and
shareable lessons.
The costs of incident sharing (e.g., public relations risks) are concentrated on the sharing organiza-
tion, although the benefits are shared broadly by those who gain valuable information about AI inci-
dents. Thus, a cooperative approach needs to be taken for incident sharing that addresses the potential
downsides. A more robust infrastructure for incident sharing (as outlined above), including options
for anonymized reporting, would help ensure that fear of negative repercussions from sharing does not
prevent the benefits of such sharing from being realized.36
Recommendation: AI developers should share more information about AI incidents, including
through collaborative channels.
Developers should seek to share AI incidents with a broad audience so as to maximize their usefulness,
and take advantage of collaborative channels such as centralized incident databases as that infrastructure
matures. In addition, they should move towards publicizing their commitment to (and procedures for)
doing such sharing in a routine way rather than in an ad-hoc fashion, in order to strengthen these
practices as norms within the AI development community.
Incident sharing is closely related to but distinct from responsible publication practices in AI and coor-
dinated disclosure of cybersecurity vulnerabilities [55]. Beyond implementation of progressively more
robust platforms for incident sharing and contributions to such platforms, future work could also explore
connections between AI and other domains in more detail, and identify key lessons from other domains
in which incident sharing is more mature (such as the nuclear and cybersecurity industries).
Over the longer term, lessons learned from experimentation and research could crystallize into a mature
body of knowledge on different types of AI incidents, reporting processes, and the costs associated with
incident sharing. This, in turn, can inform any eventual government efforts to require or incentivize
certain forms of incident reporting.
36We do not mean to claim that building and using such infrastructure would be sufficient to ensure that AI incidents are
addressed effectively. Sharing is only one part of the puzzle for effectively managing incidents. For example, attention should
also be paid to ways in which organizations developing AI, and particularly safety-critical AI, can become "high reliability
organizations" (see, e.g., [54]).
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3 Software Mechanisms and Recommendations
Software mechanisms involve shaping and revealing the functionality of existing AI systems. They can
support verification of new types of claims or verify existing claims with higher confidence. This section
begins with an overview of the landscape of software mechanisms relevant to verifying claims, and then
highlights several key problems, mechanisms, and associated recommendations.
Software mechanisms, like software itself, must be understood in context (with an appreciation for the
role of the people involved). Expertise about many software mechanisms is not widespread, which
can create challenges for building trust through such mechanisms. For example, an AI developer that
wants to provide evidence for the claim that "user data is kept private" can help build trust in the lab’s
compliance with a a formal framework such as differential privacy, but non-experts may have in mind
a different definition of privacy.37 It is thus critical to consider not only which claims can and can’t be
substantiated with existing mechanisms in theory, but also who is well-positioned to scrutinize these
mechanisms in practice.38
Keeping their limitations in mind, software mechanisms can substantiate claims associated with AI de-
velopment in various ways that are complementary to institutional and hardware mechanisms. They
can allow researchers, auditors, and others to understand the internal workings of any given system.
They can also help characterize the behavioral profile of a system over a domain of expected usage.
Software mechanisms could support claims such as:
• This system is robust to ’natural’ distributional shifts [49] [56];
• This system is robust even to adversarial examples [57] [58];
• This system has a well-characterized error surface and users have been informed of contexts in
which the system would be unsafe to use;
• This system’s decisions exhibit statistical parity with respect to sensitive demographic attributes39;
and
• This system provides repeatable or reproducible results.
Below, we summarize several clusters of mechanisms which help to substantiate some of the claims
above.
Reproducibility of technical results in AI is a key way of enabling verification of claims about system
37For example, consider a desideratum for privacy: access to a dataset should not enable an adversary to learn anything
about an individual that could not be learned without access to the database. Differential privacy as originally conceived does
not guarantee this–rather, it guarantees (to an extent determined by a privacy budget) that one cannot learn whether that
individual was in the database in question.
38In Section 3.3, we discuss the role that computing power–in addition to expertise–can play in influencing who can verify
which claims.
39Conceptions of, and measures for, fairness in machine learning, philosophy, law, and beyond vary widely. See, e.g., Xiang
and Raji [59] and Binns [60].
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properties, and a number of ongoing initiatives are aimed at improving reproducibility in AI.4041 Publi-
cation of results, models, and code increase the ability of outside parties (especially technical experts)
to verify claims made about AI systems. Careful experimental design and the use of (and contribution
to) standard software libraries can also improve reproducibility of particular results.42
Formal verification establishes whether a system satisfies some requirements using the formal methods
of mathematics. Formal verification is often a compulsory technique deployed in various safety-critical
domains to provide guarantees regarding the functional behaviors of a system. These are typically guar-
antees that testing cannot provide. Until recently, AI systems utilizing machine learning (ML)43 have
not generally been subjected to such rigor, but the increasing use of ML in safety-critical domains, such
as automated transport and robotics, necessitates the creation of novel formal analysis techniques ad-
dressing ML models and their accompanying non-ML components. Techniques for formally verifying ML
models are still in their infancy and face numerous challenges,44 which we discuss in Appendix VI(A).
The empirical verification and validation of machine learning by machine learning has been pro-
posed as an alternative paradigm to formal verification. Notably, it can be more practical than formal
verification, but since it operates empirically, the method cannot as fully guarantee its claims. Machine
learning could be used to search for common error patterns in another system’s code, or be used to
create simulation environments to adversarially find faults in an AI system’s behavior.
For example, adaptive stress testing (AST) of an AI system allows users to find the most likely failure of a
system for a given scenario using reinforcement learning [61], and is being used by to validate the next
generation of aircraft collision avoidance software [62]. Techniques requiring further research include
using machine learning to evaluate another machine learning system (either by directly inspecting its
policy or by creating environments to test the model) and using ML to evaluate the input of another
machine learning model. In the future, data from model failures, especially pooled across multiple labs
and stakeholders, could potentially be used to create classifiers that detect suspicious or anomalous AI
behavior.
Practical verification is the use of scientific protocols to characterize a model’s data, assumptions, and
performance. Training data can be rigorously evaluated for representativeness [63] [64]; assumptions
can be characterized by evaluating modular components of an AI model and by clearly communicating
output uncertainties; and performance can be characterized by measuring generalization, fairness, and
performance heterogeneity across population subsets. Causes of differences in performance between
40We note the distinction between narrow senses of reproducibility that focus on discrete technical results being reproducible
given the same initial conditions, sometimes referred to as repeatability, and broader senses of reproducibility that involve
reported performance gains carrying over to different contexts and implementations.
41One way to promote robustness is through incentivizing reproducibility of reported results. There are increas-
ing effort to award systems the recognition that they are robust, e.g., through ACM’s artifact evaluation badges
https://www.acm.org/publications/policies/artifact-review-badging. Conferences are also introducing artifact evaluation,
e.g., in the intersection between computer systems research and ML. See, e.g., https://reproindex.com/event/repro-
sml2020 and http://cknowledge.org/request.html The Reproducibility Challenge is another notable effort in this area:
https://reproducibility-challenge.github.io/neurips2019/
42In the following section on hardware mechanisms, we also discuss how reproducibility can be advanced in part by leveling
the playing field between industry and other sectors with respect to computing power.
43Machine learning is a subfield of AI focused on the design of software that improves in response to data, with that data
taking the form of unlabeled data, labeled data, or experience. While other forms of AI that do not involve machine learning
can still raise privacy concerns, we focus on machine learning here given the recent growth in associated privacy techniques
as well as the widespread deployment of machine learning.
44Research into perception-based properties such as pointwise robustness, for example, are not sufficiently comprehensive
to be applied to real-time critical AI systems such as autonomous vehicles.
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models could be robustly attributed via randomized controlled trials.
A developer may wish to make claims about a system’s adversarial robustness.45 Currently, the security
balance is tilted in favor of attacks rather than defenses, with only adversarial training [65] having
stood the test of multiple years of attack research. Certificates of robustness, based on formal proofs, are
typically approximate and give meaningful bounds of the increase in error for only a limited range of
inputs, and often only around the data available for certification (i.e. not generalizing well to unseen
data [66] [67] [68]). Without approximation, certificates are computationally prohibitive for all but the
smallest real world tasks [69]. Further, research is needed on scaling formal certification methods to
larger model sizes.
The subsections below discuss software mechanisms that we consider especially important to advance
further. In particular, we discuss audit trails, interpretability, and privacy-preserving machine learn-
ing.
45Adversarial robustness refers to an AI system’s ability to perform well in the context of (i.e. to be robust against) "adver-
sarial" inputs, or inputs designed specifically to degrade the system’s performance.
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3.1 Audit Trails
Problem:
AI systems lack traceable logs of steps taken in problem-definition, design, development, and
operation, leading to a lack of accountability for subsequent claims about those systems’ prop-
erties and impacts.
Audit trails can improve the verifiability of claims about engineered systems, although they are not yet a
mature mechanism in the context of AI. An audit trail is a traceable log of steps in system operation, and
potentially also in design and testing. We expect that audit trails will grow in importance as AI is applied
to more safety-critical contexts. They will be crucial in supporting many institutional trust-building
mechanisms, such as third-party auditors, government regulatory bodies,46 and voluntary disclosure of
safety-relevant information by companies.
Audit trails could cover all steps of the AI development process, from the institutional work of problem
and purpose definition leading up to the initial creation of a system, to the training and development of
that system, all the way to retrospective accident analysis.
There is already strong precedence for audit trails in numerous industries, in particular for safety-critical
systems. Commercial aircraft, for example, are equipped with flight data recorders that record and cap-
ture multiple types of data each second [70]. In safety-critical domains, the compliance of such evidence
is usually assessed within a larger "assurance case" utilising the CAE or Goal-Structuring-Notation (GSN)
frameworks.47 Tools such as the Assurance and Safety Case Environment (ACSE) exist to help both the
auditor and the auditee manage compliance claims and corresponding evidence. Version control tools
such as GitHub or GitLab can be utilized to demonstrate individual document traceability. Proposed
projects like Verifiable Data Audit [71] could establish confidence in logs of data interactions and usage.
Recommendation: Standards setting bodies should work with academia and industry to develop
audit trail requirements for safety-critical applications of AI systems.
Organizations involved in setting technical standards–including governments and private actors–should
establish clear guidance regarding how to make safety-critical AI systems fully auditable.48 Although
application dependent, software audit trails often require a base set of traceability49 trails to be demon-
strated for qualification;50 the decision to choose a certain set of trails requires considering trade-offs
about efficiency, completeness, tamperproofing, and other design considerations. There is flexibility in
the type of documents or evidence the auditee presents to satisfy these general traceability requirements
46Such as the National Transportation Safety Board with regards to autonomous vehicle traffic accidents.
47See Appendix III for discussion of assurance cases and related frameworks.
48Others have argued for the importance of audit trails for AI elsewhere, sometimes under the banner of "logging." See, e.g.,
[72].
49Traceability in this context refers to "the ability to verify the history, location, or application of an item by means of doc-
umented recorded identification," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traceability, where the item in question is digital in nature,
and might relate to various aspects of an AI system’s development and deployment process.
50This includes traceability: between the system safety requirements and the software safety requirements, between the
software safety requirements specification and software architecture, between the software safety requirements specification
and software design, between the software design specification and the module and integration test specifications, between
the system and software design requirements for hardware/software integration and the hardware/software integration test
specifications, between the software safety requirements specification and the software safety validation plan, and between
the software design specification and the software verification (including data verification) plan.
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(e.g., between test logs and requirement documents, verification and validation activities, etc.).51
Existing standards often define in detail the required audit trails for specific applications. For example,
IEC 61508 is a basic functional safety standard required by many industries, including nuclear power.
Such standards are not yet established for AI systems. A wide array of audit trails related to an AI
development process can already be produced, such as code changes, logs of training runs, all outputs
of a model, etc. Inspiration might be taken from recent work on internal algorithmic auditing [36] and
ongoing work on the documentation of AI systems more generally, such as the ABOUT ML project [27].
Importantly, we recommend that in order to have maximal impact, any standards for AI audit trails
should be published freely, rather than requiring payment as is often the case.
51See Appendix III.
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3.2 Interpretability
Problem:
It’s difficult to verify claims about "black-box" AI systems that make predictions without ex-
planations or visibility into their inner workings. This problem is compounded by a lack of
consensus on what interpretability means.
Despite remarkable performance on a variety of problems, AI systems are frequently termed "black
boxes" due to the perceived difficulty of understanding and anticipating their behavior. This lack of
interpretability in AI systems has raised concerns about using AI models in high stakes decision-making
contexts where human welfare may be compromised [73]. Having a better understanding of how the in-
ternal processes within these systems work can help proactively anticipate points of failure, audit model
behavior, and inspire approaches for new systems.
Research in model interpretability is aimed at helping to understand how and why a particular model
works. A precise, technical definition for interpretability is elusive; by nature, the definition is subject
to the inquirer. Characterizing desiderata for interpretable models is a helpful way to formalize inter-
pretability [74] [75]. Useful interpretability tools for building trust are also highly dependent on the
target user and the downstream task. For example, a model developer or regulator may be more inter-
ested in understanding model behavior over the entire input distribution whereas a novice layperson
may wish to understand why the model made a particular prediction for their individual case.52
Crucially, an "interpretable" model may not be necessary for all situations. The weight we place upon a
model being interpretable may depend upon a few different factors, for example:
• More emphasis in sensitive domains (e.g., autonomous driving or healthcare,53 where an incor-
rect prediction adversely impacts human welfare) or when it is important for end-users to have
actionable recourse (e.g., bank loans) [77];
• Less emphasis given historical performance data (e.g., a model with sufficient historical perfor-
mance may be used even if it’s not interpretable); and
• Less emphasis if improving interpretability incurs other costs (e.g., compromising privacy).
In the longer term, for sensitive domains where human rights and/or welfare can be harmed, we antic-
ipate that interpretability will be a key component of AI system audits, and that certain applications of
AI will be gated on the success of providing adequate intuition to auditors about the model behavior.
This is already the case in regulated domains such as finance [78].54
An ascendent topic of research is how to compare the relative merits of different interpretability methods
in a sensible way. Two criteria appear to be crucial: a. The method should provide sufficient insight for
52While definitions in this area are contested, some would distinguish between "interpretability" and "explainability" as
categories for these two directions, respectively.
53See, e.g., Sendak et. al. [76] which focuses on building trust in a hospital context, and contextualizes the role of inter-
pretability in this process.
54In New York, an investigation is ongoing into apparent gender discrimination associated with the Apple Card’s credit line
allowances. This case illustrates the interplay of (a lack of) interpretability and the potential harms associated with automated
decision-making systems [79].
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the end-user to understand how the model is making its predictions (e.g., to assess if it aligns with
human judgment), and b. the interpretable explanation should be faithful to the model, i.e., accurately
reflect its underlying behavior.
Work on evaluating a., while limited in treatment, has primarily centered on comparing methods using
human surveys [80]. More work at the intersection of human-computer interaction, cognitive science,
and interpretability research–e.g., studying the efficacy of interpretability tools or exploring possible
interfaces–would be welcome, as would further exploration of how practitioners currently use such
tools [81] [82] [83] [78] [84].
Evaluating b., the reliability of existing methods is an active area of research [85] [86] [87] [88] [89]
[90] [91] [92] [93]. This effort is complicated by the lack of ground truth on system behavior (if we
could reliably anticipate model behavior under all circumstances, we would not need an interpretability
method). The wide use of interpretable tools in sensitive domains underscores the continued need to
develop benchmarks that assess the reliability of produced model explanations.
It is important that techniques developed under the umbrella of interpretability not be used to provide
clear explanations when such clarity is not feasible. Without sufficient rigor, interpretability could be
used in service of unjustified trust by providing misleading explanations for system behavior. In identi-
fying, carrying out, and/or funding research on interpretability, particular attention should be paid to
whether and how such research might eventually aid in verifying claims about AI systems with high
degrees of confidence to support risk assessment and auditing.
Recommendation: Organizations developing AI and funding bodies should support research into
the interpretability of AI systems, with a focus on supporting risk assessment and auditing.
Some areas of interpretability research are more developed than others. For example, attribution meth-
ods for explaining individual predictions of computer vision models are arguably one of the most well-
developed research areas. As such, we suggest that the following under-explored directions would be
useful for the development of interpretability tools that could support verifiable claims about system
properties:
• Developing and establishing consensus on the criteria, objectives, and frameworks for interpretabil-
ity research;
• Studying the provenance of a learned model (e.g., as a function of the distribution of training data,
choice of particular model families, or optimization) instead of treating models as fixed; and
• Constraining models to be interpretable by default, in contrast to the standard setting of trying to
interpret a model post-hoc.
This list is not intended to be exhaustive, andwe recognize that there is uncertainty about which research
directions will ultimately bear fruit. We discuss the landscape of interpretability research further in
Appendix VI(C).
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3.3 Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
Problem:
A range of methods can potentially be used to verifiably safeguard the data andmodels involved
in AI development. However, standards are lacking for evaluating new privacy-preserving ma-
chine learning techniques, and the ability to implement them currently lies outside a typical AI
developer’s skill set.
Training datasets for AI often include sensitive information about people, raising risks of privacy viola-
tion. These risks include unacceptable access to raw data (e.g., in the case of an untrusted employee or a
data breach), unacceptable inference from a trained model (e.g., when sensitive private information can
be extracted from a model), or unacceptable access to a model itself (e.g., when the model represents
personalized preferences of an individual or is protected by intellectual property).
For individuals to trust claims about an ML system sufficiently so as to participate in its training, they
need evidence about data access (who will have access to what kinds of data under what circumstances),
data usage, and data protection. The AI development community, and other relevant communities, have
developed a range of methods and mechanisms to address these concerns, under the general heading of
"privacy-preserving machine learning" (PPML) [94].
Privacy-preserving machine learning aims to protect the privacy of data or models used in machine
learning, at training or evaluation time and during deployment. PPML has benefits for model users, and
for those who produce the data that models are trained on.
PPML is heavily inspired by research from the cryptography and privacy communities and is performed
in practice using a combination of techniques, each with its own limitations and costs. These techniques
are a powerful tool for supporting trust between data owners and model users, by ensuring privacy of
key information. However, they must be used judiciously, with informed trade-offs among (1) privacy
benefits, (2) model quality, (3) AI developer experience and productivity, and (4) overhead costs such as
computation, communication, or energy consumption. They are also not useful in all contexts; therefore,
a combination of techniques may be required in some contexts to protect data and models from the
actions of well-resourced malicious actors.
Before turning to our recommendation, we provide brief summaries of several PPML techniques that
could support verifiable claims.
Federated learning is a machine learning technique where many clients (e.g., mobile devices or whole
organizations) collaboratively train a model under the orchestration of a central server (e.g., service
provider), while keeping the training data decentralized [95]. Each client’s raw data is stored locally and
not exchanged or transferred [95]. Federated learning addresses privacy concerns around the centralized
collection of raw data, by keeping the data where it is generated (e.g., on the user’s device or in a local
silo) and only allowing model updates to leave the client.
Federated learning does not, however, fully guarantee the privacy of sensitive data on its own, as some
aspects of raw data could be memorized in the training process and extracted from the trained model if
measures are not taken to address this threat. These measures include quantifying the degree to which
models memorize training data [96], and incorporating differential privacy techniques to limit the con-
tribution of individual clients in the federated setting [97]. Even when used by itself, federated learning
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addresses the threats that are endemic to centralized data collection and access, such as unauthorized
access, data hacks, and leaks, and the inability of data owners to control their data lifecycle.
Differential privacy [98] is a system for publicly sharing information derived from a dataset by de-
scribing the patterns of groups within the dataset, while withholding information about individuals in
the dataset; it allows for precise measurements of privacy risks for current and potential data owners,
and can address the raw-data-extraction threat described above. Differential privacy works through the
addition of a controlled amount of statistical noise to obscure the data contributions from records or
individuals in the dataset.55 Differential privacy is already used in various private and public AI settings,
and researchers are exploring its role in compliance with new privacy regulations [100] [99].
Differential privacy and federated learning complement each other in protecting the privacy of raw data:
federated learning keeps the raw data on the personal device, so it is never seen by the model trainer,
while differential privacy ensures the model sufficiently prevents the memorization of raw data, so that
it cannot be extracted from the model by its users.56 These techniques do not, however, protect the
model itself from theft [101].
Encrypted computation addresses this risk by allowing the model to train and run on encrypted data
while in an encrypted state, at the cost of overhead in terms of computation and communication. As a re-
sult, those training the model will not be able to see, leak, or otherwise abuse the data in its unencrypted
form. The most well known methods for encrypted computation are homomorphic encryption, secure
multi-party computation, and functional encryption [102]. For example, one of OpenMined’s upcoming
projects is Encrypted Machine Learning as a Service, which allows a model owner and data owner to
use their model and data to make a prediction, without the model owner disclosing their model, and
without the data owner disclosing their data.57
These software mechanisms can guarantee tighter bounds on AI model usage than the legal agreements
that developers currently employ, and tighter bounds on user data usage than institutional mechanisms
such as user privacy agreements. Encrypted computation could also potentially improve the verifiability
of claims by allowing sensitive models to be shared for auditing in a more secure fashion. A hardware-
based method to protect models from theft (and help protect raw data from adversaries) is the use of
secure enclaves, as discussed in Section 4.1 below.
In the future, it may be possible to rely on a platform that enables verifiable data policieswhich address
some of the security and privacy vulnerabilities in existing IT systems. One proposal for such a platform
is Google’s Project Oak,58 which leverages open source secure enclaves (see Section 4.1) and formal
verification to technically enforce and assure policies around data storage, manipulation, and exchange.
As suggested by this brief overview of PPML techniques, there are many opportunities for improving
the privacy and security protections associated with ML systems. However, greater standardization of
55To illustrate how statistical noise can be helpful in protecting privacy, consider the difference between a survey that solicits
and retains "raw" answers from individuals, on the one hand, and another survey in which the respondents are asked to flip
a coin in order to determine whether they will either provide the honest answer right away or flip the coin again in order
to determine which answer to provide. The latter approach would enable individual survey respondents to have plausible
deniability regarding their true answers, but those conducting the survey could still learn useful information from the responses,
since the noise would largely cancel out at scale. For an accessible discussion of the ideas behind differential privacy and its
applications, from which this short summary was adapted, see [99].
56For an example of the combination of federated learning and differential privacy, see McMahan et. al. [97].
57See https://www.openmined.com.
58See the Appendix VI(B) for further discussion of this project.
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of PPML techniques–and in particular, the use of open source PPML frameworks that are benchmarked
against common performance measures–may be needed in order for this to translate into a major impact
on the verifiability of claims about AI development. First, robust open source frameworks are needed in
order to reduce the skill requirement for implementing PPML techniques, which to date have primarily
been adopted by large technology companies with in-house expertise in both ML and cryptography.
Second, common standards for evaluating new PPML techniques could increase the comparability of new
results, potentially accelerating research progress. Finally, standardization could improve the ability of
external parties (including users, auditors, and policymakers) to verify claims about PPML performance.
Recommendation: AI developers should develop, share, and use suites of tools for privacy-
preserving machine learning that include measures of performance against common standards.
Where possible, AI developers should contribute to, use, and otherwise support the work of open-source
communities working on PPML, such as OpenMined, Microsoft SEAL, tf-encrypted, tf-federated, and
nGraph-HE. These communities have opened up the ability to use security and privacy tools in the ML
setting, and further maturation of the software libraries built by these communities could yield still
further benefits.
Open-source communities projects or projects backed by a particular company can sometimes suffer from
a lack of stable funding support59 or independence as organizational priorities shift, suggesting a need for
an AI community-wide approach to supporting PPML’s growth. Notwithstanding some challenges asso-
ciated with open source projects, they are uniquely amenable to broad-based scrutiny and iteration, and
have yielded benefits already. Notably, integrated libraries for multiple techniques in privacy-preserving
ML have started being developed for major deep learning frameworks such as TensorFlow and PyTorch.
Benchmarks for PPML could help unify goals and measure progress across different groups.60 A central-
ized repository of real-world implementation cases, a compilation of implementation guides, and work
on standardization/interoperability would all also aid in supporting adoption and scrutiny of privacy-
preserving methods.61
59Novel approaches to funding open source work should also be considered in this context, such as GitHub’s "sponsors"
initiative. https://help.github.com/en/github/supporting-the-open-source-community-wi
th-github-sponsors/about-github-sponsors
60The use of standard tools, guides, and benchmarks can also potentially advance research in other areas, but we focus on
privacy-preserving ML in particular here given the backgrounds of the authors who contributed to this subsection. Additionally,
we note that some benchmarks have been proposed in the PPML literature for specific subsets of techniques, such as DPComp
for differential privacy, but we expect that further exploration of benchmarks across the full spectra of PPML techniques would
be valuable.
61On the other hand, we note that benchmarks also have potential disadvantages, as they incentivize developers to perform
well on the specific benchmark, rather than focusing on the specifics of the intended use case of their product or service, which
may significantly diverge from the benchmark setting; the design of benchmarks, and more diverse and adaptive evaluation
and comparison methods, is its own technical challenge, as well as an institutional challenge to incentivize appropriate curation
and use of benchmarks to establish a common understanding of what is achievable.
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4 Hardware Mechanisms and Recommendations
Computing hardware enables the training, testing, and use of AI systems. Hardware relevant to AI
development ranges from sensors, networking, andmemory, to, perhapsmost crucially, processing power
[103].62 Concerns about the security and other properties of computing hardware, as well as methods
to address those concerns in a verifiable manner, long precede the current growth in adoption of AI.
However, because of the increasing capabilities and impacts of AI systems and the particular hardware
demands of the field, there is a need for novel approaches to assuring the verifiability of claims about
the hardware used in AI development.
Hardware mechanisms involve physical computing resources (e.g., CPUs and GPUs), including their
distribution across actors, the ways they are accessed andmonitored, and their properties (e.g., how they
are designed, manufactured, or tested). Hardware can support verifiable claims in various ways. Secure
hardware can play a key role in private and secure machine learning by translating privacy constraints
and security guarantees into scrutable hardware designs or by leveraging hardware components in a
software mechanism. Hardware mechanisms can also be used to demonstrate the ways in which an
organization is using its general-purpose computing capabilities.
At a higher level, the distribution of computing power across actors can potentially influence who is
in a position to verify certain claims about AI development. This is true on the assumption that, all
things being equal, more computing power will enable more powerful AI systems to be built, and that
a technical capability to verify claims may itself require non-negligible computing resources.63 The
use of standardized, publicly available hardware (sometimes called "commodity hardware") across AI
systems also aids in the independent reproducibility of technical results, which in turn could play a role
in technical auditing and other forms of accountability. Finally, hardware mechanisms can be deployed
to enforce and verify policies relating to the security of the hardware itself (which, like software, might
be compromised through error or malice).
Existing mechanisms performing one or more of these functions are discussed below.
Formal verification, discussed above in the software mechanisms section, is the process of establishing
whether a software or hardware system satisfies some requirements or properties, using formal methods
to generate mathematical proofs. Practical tools, such as GPUVerify for GPU kernels,65 exist to formally
verify components of the AI hardware base, but verification of the complete hardware base is currently
an ambitious goal. Because only parts of the AI hardware ecosystem are verified, it is important to map
which properties are being verified for different AI accelerators and under what assumptions, who has
access to evidence of such verification processes (which may be part of a third party audit), and what
properties we should invest more research effort into verifying (or which assumption would be a priority
to drop).
62Experts disagree on the extent to which large amounts of computing power are key to progress in AI development. See,
e.g., Sutton [104] and Brooks [105] for different opinions about the importance of computing power relative to other factors.
63Since training AI systems is more compute-intensive64 than running them, it is not clear that equivalent computational
resources will always be required on the part of those verifying claims about an AI system. However, AI systems are also
beginning to require non-trivial computing resources to run, sometimes requiring the model to be split over multiple machines.
Additionally, one might need to run an AI system many times in order to verify claims about its characteristics, even if each
run is inexpensive. We thus make the conservative assumption that more computing resources would be (all things being
equal) helpful to the scrutiny of claims about large-scale AI systems, as discussed below in the context of academic access to
computing resources, while recognizing that this may not always be true in particular cases.
65http://multicore.doc.ic.ac.uk/tools/GPUVerify/
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Remote attestation leverages a "root of trust" (provided in hardware or in software, e.g., a secret key
stored in isolated memory) to cryptographically sign a measurement or property of the system, thus
providing a remote party proof of the authenticity of the measurement or property. Remote attestation
is often used to attest that a certain version of software is currently running, or that a computation took
a certain amount of time (which can then be compared to a reference by the remote party to detect
tampering) [106].
Cloud computing: Hardware is also at the heart of the relationship between cloud providers and cloud
users (as hardware resources are being rented). Associated verification mechanisms can help ensure
that computations are being performed as promised, without the client having direct physical access
to the hardware. For example, one could have assurances that a cloud-based AI service is not skimp-
ing on computations by running a less powerful model than advertised, operating on private data in a
disallowed fashion, or compromised by malware [107].
Cloud providers are a promising intervention point for trust-buildingmechanisms; a single cloud provider
services, and therefore has influence over, many customers. Even large AI labs rely predominantly on
cloud computing for some or all of their AI development. Cloud providers already employ a variety of
mechanisms to minimize risks of misuse on their platforms, including "Know Your Customer" services
and Acceptable Use Policies. These mechanisms could be extended to cover AI misuse [108]. Additional
mechanisms could be developed such as a forum where cloud providers can share best-practices about
detecting and responding to misuse and abuse of AI through their services.66
We now turn to more detailed discussions of three hardware mechanisms that could improve the verifia-
bility of claims: we highlight the importance of secure hardware for machine learning, high-precision
compute measurement, and computing power support for academia.
66These conversations could take place in existing industry fora, such as the Cloud Security Alliance
(https://cloudsecurityalliance.org), or through the establishment of new fora dedicated to AI cloud providers.
32
4.1 Secure Hardware for Machine Learning
Problem:
Hardware security features can provide strong assurances against theft of data and models,
but secure enclaves (also known as Trusted Execution Environments) are only available on
commodity (non-specialized) hardware. Machine learning tasks are increasingly executed on
specialized hardware accelerators, for which the development of secure enclaves faces signifi-
cant up-front costs and may not be the most appropriate hardware-based solution.
Since AI systems always involve physical infrastructure, the security of that infrastructure can play a
key role in claims about a system or its components being secure and private. Secure enclaves have
emerged in recent years as a way to demonstrate strong claims about privacy and security that cannot
be achieved through software alone. iPhones equipped with facial recognition for screen unlocking, for
example, store face-related data on a physically distinct part of the computer known as a secure enclave
in order to provide more robust privacy protection. Increasing the range of scenarios in which secure
enclaves can be applied in AI, as discussed in this subsection, would enable higher degrees of security
and privacy protection to be demonstrated and demanded.
A secure enclave is a set of software and hardware features that together provide an isolated execution
environment that enables a set of strong guarantees regarding security for applications running inside the
enclave [109]. Secure enclaves reduce the ability of malicious actors to access sensitive data or interfere
with a program, even if they have managed to gain access to the system outside the enclave. Secure
enclaves provide these guarantees by linking high-level desired properties (e.g., isolation of a process
from the rest of the system) to low-level design of the chip layout and low-level software interacting
with the chip.
The connection between physical design and low-level software and high-level security claims relies
on a set of underlying assumptions. Despite the fact that researchers have been able to find ways to
invalidate these underlying assumptions in some cases, and thus invalidate the high-level security claims
[110] [111], these mechanisms help to focus defensive efforts and assure users that relatively extreme
measures would be required to invalidate the claims guaranteed by the design of the enclave.
While use of secure enclaves has become relatively commonplace in the commodity computing indus-
tries, their use in machine learning is less mature. Execution of machine learning on secure enclaves has
been demonstrated, but comes with a performance overhead [112].67 Demonstrations to date have been
carried out on commodity hardware (CPUs [113] [114] and GPUs [115]) or have secure and verifiable
outsourcing of parts of the computation to less secure hardware [116] [117], rather than on hardware
directly optimized for machine learning (such as TPUs).
For most machine learning applications, the cost of using commodity hardware not specialized for ma-
chine learning is fairly low because the hardware already exists, and their computational demands can
be met on such commodity hardware. However, cutting edge machine learning models often use sig-
nificantly more computational resources [118], driving the use of more specialized hardware for both
training and inference. If used with specialized AI hardware, the use of secure enclaves would require
renewed investment for every new design, which can end up being very costly if generations are short
67For example, training ResNet-32 using Myelin (which utilises a CPU secure enclave) requires 12.9 mins/epoch and results
in a final accuracy of 90.8%, whereas the same training on a non-private CPU requires 12.3 mins/epoch and results in a final
accuracy of 92.4% [112].
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and of limited batch sizes (as the cost is amortized across all chips that use the design). Some specialized
AI hardware layouts may require entirely novel hardware security features – as the secure enclave model
may not be applicable – involving additional costs.
One particularly promising guarantee that might be provided by ML-specific hardware security features,
coupled with some form of remote attestation, is a guarantee that a model will never leave a particular
chip, which could be a key building block of more complex privacy and security policies.
Recommendation: Industry and academia should work together to develop hardware security
features for AI accelerators68 or otherwise establish best practices for the use of secure hardware
(including secure enclaves on commodity hardware) in machine learning contexts.
A focused and ongoing effort to integrate hardware security features into ML-specialized hardware could
add value, though it will require collaboration across the sector.
Recent efforts to open source secure enclave designs could help accelerate the process of comprehen-
sively analyzing the security claims made about certain systems [119]. As more workloads move to
specialized hardware, it will be important to either develop secure enclaves for such hardware (or al-
ternative hardware security solutions), or otherwise define best practices for outsourcing computation
to "untrusted" accelerators while maintaining privacy and security. Similarly, as many machine learn-
ing applications are run on GPUs, it will be important to improve the practicality of secure enclaves or
equivalent privacy protections on these processors.
The addition of dedicated security features to ML accelerators at the hardware level may need to take
a different form than a secure enclave. This is in part due to different architectures and different use
of space on the chip; in part due to different weighting of security concerns (e.g., it may be especially
important to prevent unauthorized access to user data); and in part due to a difference in economies
of scale relative to commodity chips, with many developers of ML accelerators being smaller, less-well-
resourced actors relative to established chip design companies like Intel or NVIDIA.
68An AI accelerator is a form of computing hardware that is specialized to perform an AI-related computation efficiently,
rather than to perform general purpose computation.
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4.2 High-Precision Compute Measurement
Problem:
The absence of standards for measuring the use of computational resources reduces the value
of voluntary reporting and makes it harder to verify claims about the resources used in the AI
development process.
Although we cannot know for certain due to limited transparency, it is reasonable to assume that a
significant majority of contemporary computing hardware used for AI training and inference is installed
in data centers (which could be corporate, governmental, or academic), with smaller fractions in server
rooms or attached to individual PCs.69
Many tools and systems already exist to monitor installed hardware and compute usage internally (e.g.,
across a cloud provider’s data center or across an academic cluster’s user base). A current example of
AI developers reporting on their compute usage is the inclusion of training-related details in published
research papers and pre-prints, which often share the amount of compute used to train or run a model.70
These are done for the purposes of comparison and replication, though often extra work is required to
make direct comparisons as there is no standard method for measuring and reporting compute usage.71
This ambiguity poses a challenge to trustworthy AI development, since even AI developers who want to
make verifiable claims about their hardware use are not able to provide such information in a standard
form that is comparable across organizations and contexts.
Even in the context of a particular research project, issues such as mixed precision training,72 use of
heterogeneous computing resources, and use of pretrained models all complicate accurate reporting
that is comparable across organizations.73 The lack of a common standard or accepted practice on how
to report the compute resources used in the context of a particular project has led to several efforts to
extract or infer the computational requirements of various advances and compare them using a common
framework [118].
The challenge of providing accurate and useful information about the computational requirements of a
system or research project is not unique to AI – computer systems research has struggled with this prob-
lem for some time.74 Both fields have seen an increasing challenge in comparing and reproducing results
now that organizations with exceptionally large compute resources (also referred to as "hyperscalers")
69For reference, the Cisco Global Cloud Index forecasts that the ratio of data center traffic to non-data center traffic by 2021
will be 103:1. When looking just at data centers, they forecast that by 2021, 94% of workloads and compute instances will be
processed by cloud data centers, with the remaining 6% processed by traditional data centers. Note, however, that these are
for general workloads, not AI specific [120].
70Schwartz and Dodge et al. have recommended that researchers always publish financial and computational costs alongside
performance increases [121].
71There are, however, emerging efforts at standardization in particular contexts. The Transaction Processing Performance
Council has a related working group, and efforts like MLPerf are contributing to standardization of some inference-related
calculations, though accounting for training remains especially problematic.
72Mixed precision refers to the growing use of different binary representations of floating point numbers with varying levels
of precision (e.g., 8 bit, 16 bit, 32 bit or 64 bit) at different points of a computation, often trading-off lower precision for higher
throughput or performance in ML contexts relative to non-ML contexts. Since an 8 bit floating point operation, say, differs in
hardware requirements from a 64 bit floating point operation, traditional measures in terms of Floating Point Operations Per
Second (FLOPS) fail to capture this heterogeneity.
73For an illustrative discussion of the challenges associated with reporting compute usage for a large-scale AI project, see,
e.g., OpenAI’s Dota 2 project [122].
74See, e.g., Vitek & Kalibera [123] and Hoefler & Belli [124].
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play an ever-increasing role in research in those fields. We believe there is value in further engaging
with the computer systems research community to explore challenges of reproducibility, benchmarking,
and reporting, though we also see value in developing AI-specific standards for compute reporting.
Increasing the precision and standardization of compute reporting could enable easier comparison of
research results across organizations. Improved methods could also serve as building blocks of credible
third party oversight of AI projects: an auditor might note, for example, that an organization has more
computing power available to it than was reportedly used on an audited project, and thereby surface
unreported activities relevant to that project. And employees of an organization are better able to ensure
that their organization is acting responsibly to the extent that they are aware of how computing power,
data, and personnel are being allocated internally for different purposes.
Recommendation: One or more AI labs should estimate the computing power involved in a single
project in great detail, and report on the potential for wider adoption of such methods.
We see value in one or more AI labs conducting a "comprehensive" compute accounting effort, as a means
of assessing the feasibility of standardizing such accounting. "Comprehensive" here refers to accounting
for as much compute usage pertinent to the project as is feasible, and increasing the precision of reported
results relative to existing work.
It is not clear how viable standardization is, given the aforementioned challenges, though there is likely
room for at least incremental progress: just in the past few years, a number of approaches to calculating
and reporting compute usage have been tried, and in some cases have propagated across organizations.
AI researchers interested in conducting such a pilot should work with computer systems researchers who
have worked on related challenges in other contexts, including the automating of logging and reporting.
Notably, accounting of this sort has costs associated with it, and the metrics of success are unclear. Some
accounting efforts could be useful for experts but inaccessible to non-experts, for example, or could only
be workable in a particular context (e.g., with a relatively simple training and inference pipeline and
limited use of pretrained models). As such, we do not advocate for requiring uniformly comprehensive
compute reporting.
Depending on the results of early pilots, new tools might help automate or simplify such reporting,
though this is uncertain. One reason for optimism about the development of a standardized approach
is that a growing fraction of computing power usage occurs in the cloud at "hyperscale" data centers,
so a relatively small number of actors could potentially implement best practices that apply to a large
fraction of AI development [120].
It is also at present unclear who should have access to reports about compute accounting. While we
applaud the current norm in AI research to voluntarily share compute requirements publicly, we expect
for-profit entities would have to balance openness with commercial secrecy, and government labs may
need to balance openness with security considerations. This may be another instance in which audi-
tors or independent verifiers could play a role. Standardization of compute accounting is one path to
formalizing the auditing practice in this space, potentially as a building block to more holistic auditing
regimes. However, as with other mechanisms discussed here, it is insufficient on its own.
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4.3 Compute Support for Academia
Problem:
The gap in compute resources between industry and academia limits the ability of those outside
of industry to scrutinize technical claims made by AI developers, particularly those related to
compute-intensive systems.
In recent years, a large number of academic AI researchers have transitioned into industry AI labs. One
reason for this shift is the greater availability of computing resources in industry compared to academia.
This talent shift has resulted in a range of widely useful software frameworks and algorithmic insights,
but has also raised concerns about the growing disparity between the computational resources available
to academia and industry [125].
The disparity between industry and academia is clear overall, even though some academic labs are
generously supported by government75 or industry76 sponsors, and some government agencies are on
the cutting edge of building and providing access to supercomputers.77
Here we focus on a specific benefit of governments78 taking action to level the playing field of computing
power: namely, improving the ability of financially disinterested parties such as academics to verify
the claims made by AI developers in industry, especially in the context of compute-intensive systems.
Example use cases include:
• Providing open-source alternatives to commercial AI systems: given the current norm in AI
development of largely-open publication of research, a limiting factor in providing open source al-
ternatives to commercially trained AI models is often the computing resources required. As models
becomemore compute-intensive, government support may be required to maintain a thriving open
source AI ecosystem and the various benefits that accrue from it.
• Increasing scrutiny of commercial models: as outlined in the institutional mechanisms section
(see the subsections on red team exercises and bias and safety bounties), there is considerable
value in independent third parties stress-testing the models developed by others. While "black box"
testing can take place without access to significant compute resources (e.g., by remote access to an
instance of the system), local replication for the purpose of testing could make testing easier, and
could uncover further issues than those surfaced via remote testing alone. Additional computing
resources may be especially needed for local testing of AI systems that are too large to run on a
single computer (such as some recent language models).
• Leveraging AI to test AI: as AI systems become more complex, it may be useful or even necessary
to deploy adaptive, automated tests to explore potential failure modes or hidden biases, and such
testing may become increasingly compute-intensive.
75https://epsrc.ukri.org/research/facilities/hpc/
76See, e.g., https://www.tensorflow.org/tfrc, https://aws.amazon.com/grants/ and https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/research/academic-program/microsoft-azure-for-research/ for examples of industry support for academic computing.
77For example, the US Department of Energy’s supercomputing division currently hosts the fastest supercomputer worldwide.
78While industry actors can and do provide computing power support to non-industry actors in beneficial ways, the scale and
other properties of such programs are likely to be affected by the rises and falls of particular companies’ commercial fortunes,
and thus are not a reliable long-term solution to the issues discussed here.
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• Verifying claims about compute requirements: as described above, accounting for the compute
inputs of model training is currently an open challenge in AI development. In tandem with stan-
dardization of compute accounting, compute support to non-industry actors would enable repli-
cation efforts, which would verify or undermine claims made by AI developers about the resource
requirements of the systems they develop.
Recommendation: Government funding bodies should substantially increase funding of comput-
ing power resources for researchers in academia, in order to improve the ability of those re-
searchers to verify claims made by industry.
While computing power is not a panacea for addressing the gap in resources available for research in
academia and industry, funding bodies such as those in governments could level the playing field between
sectors by more generously providing computing credits to researchers in academia.79 Such compute
provision could be made more affordable by governments leveraging their purchasing power in negoti-
ations over bulk compute purchases. Governments could also build their own compute infrastructures
for this purpose. The particular amounts of compute in question, securing the benefits of scale while
avoiding excessive dependence on a particular compute provider, and ways of establishing appropriate
terms for the use of such compute are all exciting areas for future research.80
79As advocated by various authors, e.g., Sastry et al. [118], Rasser & Lambert et. al. [126], and Etchemendy and Li [127].
80This may require significant levels of funding, and so the benefits should be balanced against the opportunity cost of public
spending.
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5 Conclusion
Artificial intelligence has the potential to transform society in ways both beneficial and harmful. Ben-
eficial applications are more likely to be realized, and risks more likely to be avoided, if AI developers
earn rather than assume the trust of society and of one another. This report has fleshed out one way
of earning such trust, namely the making and assessment of verifiable claims about AI development
through a variety of mechanisms. A richer toolbox of mechanisms for this purpose can inform develop-
ers’ efforts to earn trust, the demands made of AI developers by activists and civil society organizations,
and regulators’ efforts to ensure that AI is developed responsibly.
If the widespread articulation of ethical principles can be seen as a first step toward ensuring responsible
AI development, insofar as it helped to establish a standard against which behavior can be judged, then
the adoption of mechanisms to make verifiable claims represents a second. The authors of this report
are eager to see further steps forward and hope that the framing of these mechanisms inspires the AI
community to begin a meaningful dialogue around approaching verifiability in a collaborative fashion
across organizations. We are keen to discover, study, and foreground additional institutional, software,
and hardware mechanisms that could help enable trustworthy AI development. We encourage readers
interested in collaborating in these or other areas to contact the corresponding authors of the report.81
As suggested by the title of the report (which references supporting verifiable claims rather than ensur-
ing them), we see the mechanisms discussed here as enabling incremental improvements rather than
providing a decisive solution to the challenge of verifying claims in the AI ecosystem. And despite the
benefits associated with verifiable claims, they are also insufficient to ensure that AI developers will
behave responsibly. There are at least three reasons for this.
First, there is a tension between verifiability of claims and the generality of such claims. This tension
arises because the narrow properties of a system are easier to verify than the general ones, which tend
to be of greater social interest. Safety writ large, for example, is inherently harder to verify than perfor-
mance on a particular metric for safety. Additionally, broad claims about the beneficial societal impacts
of a system or organization are harder to verify than more circumscribed claims about impacts in specific
contexts.
Second, the verifiability of claims does not ensure that they will be verified in practice. The mere ex-
istence of mechanisms for supporting verifiable claims does not ensure that they will be demanded by
consumers, citizens, and policymakers (and even if they are, the burden ought not to be on them to do
so). For example, consumers often use technologies in ways that are inconsistent with their stated values
(e.g., a concern for personal privacy) because other factors such as convenience and brand loyalty also
play a role in influencing their behavior [128].
Third, even if a claim about AI development is shown to be false, asymmetries of power may prevent
corrective steps from being taken. Members of marginalized communities, who often bear the brunt of
harms associated with AI [2], often lack the political power to resist technologies that they deem detri-
mental to their interests. Regulation will be required to ensure that AI developers provide evidence that
bears on important claims they make, to limit applications of AI where there is insufficient technical and
social infrastructure for ensuring responsible development, or to increase the variety of viable options
81The landing page for this report, www.towardtrustworthyai.com, will also be used to share relevant updates after the
report’s publication.
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available to consumers that are consistent with their stated values.
These limitations notwithstanding, verifiable claims represent a step toward a more trustworthy AI de-
velopment ecosystem. Without a collaborative effort between AI developers and other stakeholders to
improve the verifiability of claims, society’s concerns about AI development are likely to grow: AI is
being applied to an increasing range of high-stakes tasks, and with this wide deployment comes a grow-
ing range of risks. With a concerted effort to enable verifiable claims about AI development, there is
a greater opportunity to positively shape AI’s impact and increase the likelihood of widespread societal
benefits.
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Appendices
I Workshop and Report Writing Process
This report began as an effort to identify areas for productive work related to trust in AI development.
The project began in earnest with an interdisciplinary expert workshop in San Francisco in April of 2019,
which brought together participants from academia, industry labs, and civil society organizations.82 As
discussed below, during the writing process, we shifted our focus to verifiable claims in particular, rather
than trust more broadly.
Workshop attendees are listed below in alphabetical order:
• Amanda Askell
• Andrew Critch
• Andrew Lohn
• Andrew Reddie
• Andrew Trask
• Ben Garfinkel
• Brian Tse
• Catherine Olsson
• Charina Chou
• Chris Olah
• David Luan
• Dawn Song
• Emily Oehlsen
• Eric Sigler
• Genevieve Fried
• Gillian Hadfield
• Heidy Khlaaf
• Helen Toner
• Ivan Vendrov
• Jack Clark
• Jeff Alstott
• Jeremy Nixon
• Jingying Yang
• Joshua Kroll
• Lisa Dyer
• Miles Brundage
• Molly Welch
• Paul Christiano
• Peter Eckersley
• Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh
• Shahar Avin
• Shixiong (Austin) Zhang
• Teddy Collins
• Tim Hwang
• William Isaac
82Our intent with this section of the report is to be transparent with readers about our process and to acknowledge some of
the voices and methods missing from that process. We also hope that providing information about our process could be helpful
for those considering similar multi-stakeholder research projects.
60
Given our initial focus on synthesizing and extending existing work, we brought together experts in
dimensions of trust that were identified in a pre-workshop white paper, several of which are discussed
in this report (such as secure enclaves, third party auditing, and privacy-preserving machine learning).
However, a number of voices were missing from that conversation. The workshop could have bene-
fited in particular from greater gender diversity (fewer than one third of participants were women, and
none were members of trans or non-binary communities); greater racial diversity (people of color and
especially women of color were under-represented, particularly given the number of women of color
with relevant expertise on trust in AI development); greater representation of low income communities;
greater representation of people with disabilities; and greater geographic, political, philosophical, and
religious diversity.
Following the workshop, the corresponding authors led a multi-stakeholder writing, editing, and feed-
back process. A subset of workshop attendees opted to engage in the writing process for the report.
After the first round of writing and editing, we tried to incorporate new authors with complementary
expertise to those at the original workshop. Notwithstanding these efforts, not all dimensions of trust in
AI development (or even verifiable claims in AI development) were represented in the expertise of the
authors. As such, over time and especially in response to external reviewer feedback, we progressively
narrowed the scope of the report in order to avoid overreach and "stay in our lane" topic-wise. One such
shift was a move from discussing trust in AI development generally to verifiable claims specifically as
the focus of the report.
The report was written in a semi-modular fashion. Experts in particular areas drafted subsections on
mechanisms or research areas with which they are familiar. These subsections were revised substantially
over time in response to author and reviewer feedback, and to shifts in the framing of the report. External
reviewers provided feedback on specific portions of the report for clarity and accuracy, although the
report as a whole was not formally peer reviewed.
Given the number of authors involved and the wide-ranging nature of the report, it was difficult to ensure
that all authors were fully supportive of all content throughout the writing process. Where appropriate,
we have included footnotes to clarify process and attribution.
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II Key Terms and Concepts
AI: we define artificial intelligence (AI) as any digital system capable of performing tasks commonly
thought to require intelligence, with these tasks often being learned from data and/or experience.83
AI system: we define an AI system as a software process (with the characteristics of AI mentioned
above), running on physical hardware, under the direction of humans operating in some institutional
context. This framing of AI systems informs the discussion of mechanisms in the report. The properties
of the software, hardware, and institutions at work in a given AI system are all potentially relevant to
the verifiability of claims made by an AI developer. Focusing on any of these to the exclusion of others
could result in a flawed understanding of the overall system.
AI development: we use the term AI development to refer to the process of researching, designing,
testing, deploying, or monitoring AI as defined above.
AI developer: we use the term AI developer to refer to individuals or organizations involved in AI de-
velopment as defined broadly above, including research scientists, data engineers, and project managers
at companies building AI-based products and services as well as those in analogous roles in academia,
government, or civil society. Given the major role played by technology companies in contemporary
AI development, we pay particular attention to such companies in the report, while recognizing that
different contexts will require different approaches to earning trust.
Responsible AI development: we follow Askell et al. in defining responsible AI development as follows
[1]:
"Responsible AI development involves taking steps to ensure that AI systems have an ac-
ceptably low risk of harming their users or society and, ideally, to increase their likelihood
of being socially beneficial. This involves testing the safety and security of systems during
development, evaluating the potential social impact of the systems prior to release, being
willing to abandon research projects that fail to meet a high bar of safety, and being willing
to delay the release of a system until it has been established that it does not pose a risk to
consumers or the public."
Transparency: we define transparency as making information about the characteristics of an AI devel-
oper’s operations or their AI systems available to actors both inside and outside the organization. In
recent years, transparency has emerged as a key theme in work on the societal implications of AI.84
Transparency can benefit from the open publication of AI systems (including code, data, and models),
though privacy, safety, and competitive considerations prevent this from being appropriate in all cases.85
83Some distinctions are made between different phases of AI development in the report, although the authors have also
found it helpful to take a broad view of look at AI development: in many cases, the same mechanisms (especially institutional
ones) are applicable to multiple phases of development, and AI development was found to be the most appropriate catch-all
term for such purposes. A recent and representative example of a more granular breakdown, from Toreini et al., distinguishes
data-related steps (data collection, data preparation, and feature extraction) from model-related steps (training, testing, and
inference) [129]. In practice, these steps are not followed in a linear manner, since (e.g.) testing may inform changes to the
training process and data may be improved over time.
84See, for example, the Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning (FATML) workshop and community,
which was followed by the ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAccT).
85The necessity and sufficiency of transparency as an ideal for technical systems has also been critiqued in recent years, such
as from Ananny and Crawford [130] and Kroll et. al. [131].
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Realizing transparency in AI development requires attention to institutional mechanisms and legal struc-
tures, particularly when scrutinizing developers’ incentives and scope of activities.
Trust and trustworthiness: these concepts have been extensively explored by researchers, though a
consensus account across domains remains elusive. Substantial prior and ongoing work focuses on
how these concepts manifest in AI development. This includes academic work [129],86 government-
associated efforts such as the European Union’s High-Level Expert Group on AI [133], and industry
efforts [134] [135]. Our report focuses on a particular subset of what these concepts entail in the practice
of AI development, namely the verifiability of claims about AI development, and more specifically, the
verifiability of claims about safety, security, privacy, and fairness.
Several common frameworks for thinking about trust suggest a premium on the verifiability of claims
even when they do not reference these terms explicitly. For example, Mayer et al.’s widely cited work
[136] identifies benevolence, integrity, and ability as three pillars of trustworthiness. In the context of AI,
a developer might make claims that suggest their pursuit of a benevolent goal (e.g., by adopting a set of
ethical principles), but this needs to be accompanied by the skills and resources (ability) to achieve that
goal as well as sufficient transparency and incentives to ensure consistent follow-through (integrity).
Another prominent definition of trust which supports a focus on verifiable claims comes from Gambetta
(paraphrased below):87
"When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that
we assess that the probability [they] will take actions that are beneficial (or at least not
detrimental) is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with
[them]."
Here, too, the ability to scrutinize the claims and commitments made by an AI developer can provide
calibration regarding the extent to which trust is appropriate in a given context.
The verifiability of claims is also a key theme in the study of trust in the context of international relations
and arms control [138]. Ronald Reagan’s famous "trust but verify" (a proverb taught to him by advisor
on Russian affairs Suzanne Massie [139]) emphasized the value of generating and assessing evidence of
compliance with arms control agreements between the United States and Soviet Union. AI, verification,
and arms control are discussed further in Appendix IV.
This report is not intended to make novel contributions to the theory of trust or trustworthiness, but
rather to explore verifiable claims as a building block of trustworthy AI development. When we use
terms such as "earn trust" or "calibrate trust" in the report, these are meant to refer to cases in which
evidence is provided to substantiate claims about an actor’s behavior (including AI development).
86See [132] for a useful literature review.
87This is a modification of Gambetta’s definition [137].
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III The Nature and Importance of Verifiable Claims
Verifiable88 claims are statements for which evidence and arguments can be brought to bear on the
likelihood of those claims being true. Verifiable claims are sufficiently precise to be falsifiable, and the
degree of attainable certainty in such claims will vary across contexts.
AI developers regularly make claims regarding the properties of AI systems they develop as well as their
associated societal consequences. Claims related to AI development might include, e.g.:
• We will adhere to the data usage protocols we have specified;
• The cloud services on which our AI systems run are secure;
• We will evaluate risks and benefits of publishing AI systems in partnership with appropriately
qualified third parties;
• We will not create or sell AI systems that are intended to cause harm;
• We will assess and report any harmful societal impacts of AI systems that we build; and
• Broadly, we will act in a way that aligns with society’s interests.
The verification of claims about AI development is difficult in part due to the inherent complexity and
heterogeneity of AI and its supporting infrastructure. The highly dispersed ecosystem means there are
many actors and sets of incentives to keep track of and coordinate. Further, the speed of development
also means there is less time for claims to be carefully expressed, defended, and evaluated. And, per-
haps most critically, claims about AI development are often too vague to be assessed with the limited
information publicly made available.
Notwithstanding these challenges, there are at least three distinct reasons why it is highly desirable for
claims made about AI development to be verifiable.
First, those potentially affected by AI development–as well as those seeking to represent those parties’
interests via government or civil society–deserve to be able to scrutinize the claimsmade by AI developers
in order to reduce risk of harm or foregone benefit.
Second, to the extent that claims become verifiable, various actors such as civil society, policymakers,
and users can raise their standards for what constitutes responsible AI development. This, in turn, can
improve societal outcomes associated with the field as a whole.
Third, a lack of verifiable claims in AI development could foster or worsen a "race to the bottom" in
AI development, whereby developers seek to gain a competitive edge even when this trades off against
important societal values such as safety, security, privacy, or fairness [1]. In both commercial (e.g.,
88While the report does discuss the technical area of formal verification at several points, the sense inwhich we use "verifiable"
is distinct from how the term is used in that context. Unless otherwise specified by the use of the adjective "formal" or other
context, this report uses the word verification in a looser sense. Formal verification seeks mathematical proof that a certain
technical claim is true with certainty (subject to certain assumptions). In contrast, this report largely focuses on claims that
are unlikely to be demonstrated with absolute certainty, but which can be shown likely or unlikely to be true, i.e. trustworthy,
or untrustworthy through relevant arguments and evidence.
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autonomous vehicles) and non-commercial (e.g., military) contexts, verifiable claims may be needed to
foster cooperation rather than race-like behavior.
Without the ability to verify AI-related claims, the decision of how and whether to interact with AI sys-
tems must be made without information that could bear on the desirability of having that interaction.
Given the large (and growing) stakes of AI development, such an information deficit is ethically unten-
able. An environment of largely unverifiable claims about AI could encourage extreme reactions to AI
in particular situations (i.e., blind trust or blind rejection), resulting in both over-use and under-use of
AI. The world instead needs trust in AI development to be well-calibrated, i.e. it should be the case that
confidence in certain claims or actors is proportional to the available evidence. The benefits and risks of
AI are many, and need to be appraised with context and nuance.
In the past decade, claim-oriented approaches have been developed in order to structure arguments
about the safety of engineered systems [140], and we draw inspiration from such approaches in this
report. One result of such work is the introduction and standardization of assurance cases in numerous
domains. An assurance case is a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid
argument regarding a top-level claim (such as the safety of a nuclear power plant), and presents a
structured justification in support of that claim to decide the status of it. Assurance cases are often
required as part of a regulatory process (e.g., a certificate of safety being granted only when the regulator
is satisfied by the argument presented in a safety case).89
This work matured into the widely-used Claims, Arguments, and Evidence (CAE) framework.90 CAE is
often the framework of choice in aviation, nuclear, and defense industries worldwide to reason about
safety, security, reliability and dependability, and recent work has begun applying CAE to the safety
analysis of AI systems.91
The CAE framework consists of three key elements. Claims are assertions put forward for general accep-
tance. They’re typically statements about a property of the system or some subsystem. Claims asserted
as true without justification are assumptions, and claims supporting an argument are subclaims. Argu-
ments link evidence to a claim, which can be deterministic, probabilistic, or qualitative.92 They consist
of "statements indicating the general ways of arguing being applied in a particular case and implicitly
relied on and whose trustworthiness is well established" [144], together with validation of any scien-
tific laws used. In an engineering context, arguments should be explicit. Evidence serves as the basis
for justification of a claim. Sources of evidence can include the design, the development process, prior
experience, testing, or formal analysis.
For a sufficiently complex AI system or development process, a wide variety of mechanisms will likely
89Assurance cases are primarily concerned with demonstrating the validity (or otherwise) of the resulting argument and
have two main roles: logical reasoning and communication. Cases are usually integrated within a regulatory process that
provides for independent challenge and review. There can be a number of stakeholders including public officials, developers,
certifiers, regulators. Communication is thus essential to create a shared understanding between the different stakeholders,
build confidence and consensus
90See, e.g., this discussion of CAE in the nuclear safety context [141] and Uber’s use of GSN [142]
91See Zhao et al. [143].
92Arguments are presented in a form of defeasible reasoning of top-level claims, supported by the available evidence; and
driven by practical concerns of achieving the required goal in the best possible way considering the existing uncertainties,
point of views, concerns and perspectives of different stakeholders. Such argumentation is expected to be multidisciplinary,
and cover a wide range of mechanisms, which we aim to address. To support CAE, a graphical notation can be used to describe
the interrelationship of claims, arguments, and evidence. Claim justifications can be constructed using argument blocks–
concretion, substitution, decomposition, calculation, and evidence incorporationâA˘Tˇas well as narrative analyses that describe
the claims, arguments, and evidence in detail.
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need to be brought to bear in order to adequately substantiate a high-level claim such as "this system
was developed in accordance with our organization’s ethical principles and relevant laws."
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IV AI, Verification, and Arms Control
At an international level, arms control is a possible approach to addressing some of the risks of AI de-
velopment in a military context. Arms control involves similar issues to those discussed earlier (namely,
the need for credible commitments and close attention to transparency and incentives) in non-military
contexts. In this subsection, we provide an overview of the relationship between verifiable claims and
arms control applied to AI.
Arms control is a special case of regulation, in which nation-states cooperate to self-regulate weapons
technologies under particularly challenging conditions [145] [146] [147] [148] [149]. Unlike in domes-
tic regulation, there is no external actor to force compliance if states violate the terms of an arms control
agreement. Instead, states generally rely on reciprocity to enforce arms control agreements. If states
violate an agreement, they can often expect others to follow suit and develop the weapon themselves.
Formal agreements such as treaties act as coordination mechanisms for states to reach agreement, but
do not directly enforce compliance. Some treaties include verification regimes to help increase visibility
among states as to whether or not others are complying with an agreement, as a means of facilitating
trust [150] [151]. But it is on states themselves to take action if others are found violating an agreement,
whether through sanctions, reciprocal weapons development, military action, or other tools of statecraft.
Arms control is inherently challenging not only because there is no third-party enforcement mechanism,
but because states may be incentivized to violate agreements if they believe that doing so may give them
an edge against competitors [152] [153] [154]. This tension is exacerbated if it is challenging to verify
other states’ behavior. States may assume others are cheating and developing a prohibited technology in
secret, incentivizing them to do so as well or risk falling behind a competitor. Arms control agreements
can also bemore challenging to hold together if a technology is more widely accessible to a larger number
of actors and if defection by one actor generates incentives for others to defect. There are many cases
in history in which nation-states genuinely desired mutual restraint for certain weapons, such as turn of
the century rules regulating submarines, air-delivered weapons, and poison gas, but states were unable
to achieve effective cooperation in wartime for a variety of reasons.
Despite these hurdles, there have been successful examples of arms control for a number of weapons, in-
cluding: chemical [155] [156] and biological [157]weapons; land mines [158] [159]; cluster munitions
[160]; blinding lasers [161]; exploding bullets; limits on the proliferation, quantity, and deployment of
nuclear weapons [162]; anti-ballistic missile systems [163]; weapons of mass destruction in space; and
weapons on the Moon or in Antarctica. There are also examples of mutual restraint with some weapons
despite the lack of formal agreements, including neutron bombs, kinetic (debris-causing) anti-satellite
weapons, and certain forms of bayonets.
Even these successes highlight the limitations of arms control, however. Some treaties have collapsed
over time as more nations gained access to the underlying technology and did not abide by the prohibi-
tion. And even the most successful prohibitions, such as those on chemical and biological weapons, have
failed to rein in rogue regimes or terrorists. Despite the widespread global condemnation of chemical
weapons, Bashar al Assad has used them in Syria to murder civilians, with minimal consequences from
the international community.
In general, arms control is more likely to succeed when:93 (1) there are clear lines between which
93See, e.g., Crootof [164], Watts [165], and Scharre [166].
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weapons are prohibited and which are permitted; (2) the perceived horribleness of a weapon outweighs
its military value; (3) states have the ability, either through formal verification regimes or other mecha-
nisms, to ensure that others are complying with the regulation; and (4) fewer states are needed for an
agreement to work. Regulation can occur at multiple points of technology development, limiting or pro-
hibiting access to the underlying technology, weapons development, production, and/or use. Note also
that while some of the variables above are exogenous from the perspective of the AI community, others
are potentially amenable to influence (e.g., research could potentially improve the distinguishability of
offensive and defensive uses, or improve the general traceability and interpretability of AI systems).
AI will likely be a transformative technology in warfare [167]. Anticipating this transformation, many
in the scientific community have called for restrictions or bans on military AI applications. Because AI
is a general-purpose enabling technology with many applications, broad bans on AI overall are unlikely
to succeed. However, prohibitions on specific military applications of AI could succeed, provided states
could agree to such limits (requiring that the terms be compatible with the incentives of each party) and
that appropriate means of verifying compliance are developed and implemented.
AI technology has certain attributes that may make successful restraint challenging, however. These
include its widespread availability, dual use or "omni-use" nature [168], the difficulty in drawing clear
lines between acceptable and unacceptable AI applications, and the challenges of verifying compliance,
which are at least as difficult as those found in non-military contexts and perhaps more challenging given
the more adversarial context.
One special case worth highlighting is the development of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS).
An international LAWS ban has been the subject of discussion at the UN Convention on Certain Conven-
tional Weapons (CCW) since 2014. There are many arguments made in support of restrictions on LAWS.
Three relevant arguments are: (1) their use is immoral because AI systems will not in the foreseeable
future understand the moral, psychological, and social context at the time of killing a person (unlike a
human, who could decide to not press the trigger) [169] [170]; (2) the state of the technology today
would preclude their use under international law in anything but isolated cases, such as undersea where
civilians are not present; and (3) they might proliferate easily, enabling misuse [168] [171]. Those
skeptical of a ban on lethal autonomous weapon systems often reference mutual distrust as a reason for
development: "if we don’t develop them, others will, putting us at a strategic disadvantage" is a refrain
echoed by several great powers.
Avoiding such an impasse requires grappling with the issue of trust head-on, and closely attending to the
complexities of AI development in practice. Similar to how AI ethics principles need to be supplemented
with mechanisms that demonstrate the implementation of such principles, trust in military-relevant AI
systems must be supported by mechanisms based on a rigorous analysis of the dynamics of military AI
development. Lethal autonomous weapons are currently the focus of much related discussion, though
the use of AI in cyberwarfare and nuclear command and control have also been highlighted as chal-
lenging areas in recent years. Some early work in the direction of coordination on AI among great
powers [172] has called attention to the need for early dialogue on AI safety and security. Other work
has fleshed out the notion of meaningful human control as a cornerstone of lethal autonomous weapon
system governance [173] [161] [174].
The AI community and advocates in other disciplines have played a key role in bringing this issue to the
attention of the international community [175] [176] [177] [178] [179] [180] [181]. Similar efforts by
expert communities have improved prospects for arms control in prior contexts such as nuclear weapons
[182] [183]. There remains more to be done to raise the profile of the issue among policymakers, and
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to identify appropriate steps that individuals and organizations in the AI community can take to forestall
the development of potentially harmful systems.
AI researchers could contribute technical expertise that helps identify potential governance mechanisms
in this context. For example, AI researchers, working with arms control experts in other disciplines,
could scrutinize proposals such as defensively-oriented AI weapons systems that could target lethal au-
tonomous weapons (but not humans) and help think through different means of limiting proliferation
and ensuring human accountability. The AI community’s distributed expertise in the process of AI devel-
opment and the feasibility of different technical scenarios could thus be brought to bear to limit AI "arms
racing" and prevent a race to the bottom with respect to the safety, security, and human-accountability
of deployed military AI systems [166]. The feasibility of verifying, interpreting, and testing potential
AI systems designed for various purposes, as well as the feasibility of using different points of control
for governance of the supply chain (e.g., the computing and non-computing hardware associated with
autonomous weapons vs. the underlying software), are all issues to which AI expertise is relevant.
Of the various inputs into AI development (including hardware, software, data, and human effort), it’s
worth noting that hardware is uniquely governable, at least in principle. Computing chips, no matter
how fast, can perform only a finite and known number of operations per second, and each one has
to be produced using physical materials that are countable, trackable, and inspectable.94 Similarly,
physical robots rely on supply chains and materials that are in principle trackable. Computing power and
hardware platforms for robotics are thus potentially amenable to some governance tools used in other
domains that revolve around tracking of physical goods (e.g., export controls and on-site inspections).
While it is unclear what hardware-based verification efforts might look like in the context of AI-related
arms control, and how feasible they would be, onemight imagine, e.g., a bottleneck in themanufacturing
process for lethal autonomous weapons. In contrast to such a bottleneck, AI-related insights, data, code,
and models can be reproduced and distributed at negligible marginal cost, making it inherently difficult
to control their spread or to use them as a metric for gauging the capabilities of an organization with
respect to developing lethal decision-making systems.95 Given such considerations, it is incumbent upon
stakeholders to consider ways in which the distinctive properties of hardware might be leveraged in
service of verifying any future arms control agreements.
94We emphasize that this discussion is exploratory in nature, and that there would be major practical challenges involved
in acting on these high-level ideas. Our goal in highlighting the unique affordances of hardware is to foster creative thinking
about these issues rather than to suggest that there is a readily available solution to the weaponization of AI.
95Another potential approach would be to impose constraints on the physical characteristics of AI-enabled military systems,
such as their range, payload, endurance, or other non-AI related physical attributes.
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V Cooperation and Antitrust Laws
Collaborations between competing AI labs, even for beneficial purposes such as enabling verifiable
claims, can raise antitrust issues. Antitrust law is also known as "competition law" or "anti-monopoly law"
outside the US. This section primarily addresses US antitrust law, but given the international nature of
AI development and markets, attention to the international legal implications of industry collaborations
is warranted.
US antitrust law seeks to prevent "unreasonable" restraints on trade [184]. Unreasonableness, in turn,
is tested by economic analysis [185]–specifically, a "consumer welfare" test [186]. Although recent
academic [187] and popular [188] proposals challenge the wisdom and usefulness of this test, consumer
welfare remains the guiding principle for antitrust courts [186].
Antitrust law generally condemns per se particularly harmful restraints on trade,96 such as direct re-
straints on price, output levels, competitive bidding, and market allocation [190]. Other practices
are analyzed by the Rule of Reason, "according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of
factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the re-
straint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and [net] effect." [191] Importantly, courts in the
past have consistently rejected safety-based (and other public policy-based) defenses of anticompetitive
behavior [192].
In a leading case on point, National Society Professional Engineers v. United States, the US Supreme
Court reasoned that by adopting antitrust laws, Congress had made a "basic policy" decision to protect
competition [193]. The Court therefore concluded that the defendant’s argument that price competi-
tion between engineers was unsafe "[wa]s nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the
[antitrust laws].97" "In sum," the Court held, "the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on
the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable."98
None of this implies, however, that collaborations between competitors are always anticompetitive and
therefore violative of antitrust laws. American antitrust authorities have acknowledged that collabora-
tions between competitors can have important procompetitive benefits, such as enabling new products to
be developed, sharing useful know-how, and capitalizing on economies of scale and scope [194]. These
benefits need to be balanced against possible harms from collaboration such as reduced competition on
pricing or output levels, reducing the pace of progress, or increasing the uniformity of outputs.99
If the right antitrust governance procedures are in place, joint activities between competitive AI labs can
both enhance consumer welfare and enhance intra-industry trust. Nevertheless, it is important to not
allow the goal of supporting verifiable claims to provide cover for practices that would harm consumer
welfare and therefore erode trust between society and AI labs collectively.
96Practices are condemned per se "[o]nce experience with [that] particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with
confidence that [antitrust analysis] will condemn it..."[189]
97See id. at 695.
98Id at 696.
99See generally id.
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VI Supplemental Mechanism Analysis
A Formal Verification
Formal verification techniques for ML-based AI systems are still in their infancy. Challenges include:
• Generating formal claims and corresponding proofs regarding the behavior of ML models, given
that their output behavior may not always be clear or expected relative to the inputs (e.g., an
ML model will not necessarily display the same behavior in the field that it exhibited under a
testing environment). As a consequence, traditional formal properties must be reconceived and
redeveloped for ML models;
• The difficulty of correctly modeling certain ML systems as mathematical objects, especially if their
building blocks cannot be formalised within mathematical domains utilized by existing verification
techniques; and
• The size of real-world ML models, which are usually larger than existing verification techniques
can work with.
Some preliminary research [195] has attempted to find ways of specifying types of ML robustness that
would be amenable to formal verification: for example, pointwise robustness. Pointwise robustness is a
property that states that an ML model is robust against some model of adversarial attacks and perturba-
tions at a given point [58]. However, researchers [140] have observed that the maturity and applicability
of both the specification and corresponding techniques fall short of justifying functionality, dependabil-
ity, and security claims. In general, most system dependability properties have gone unspecified,100 and
these methodologies have not accounted for specifications that are more unique to ML-based systems.
Other efforts [69] [196] [197] aim to verify more traditional specifications regarding ML algorithms.
Some of these techniques require functional specifications, written as constraints, to be fed into special-
ized solvers which then attempt to verify that they hold on a constraint model of the ML system. The
generalization of these techniques to deep learning is challenging because they require well-defined,
mathematically specifiable properties as input which are not unique to ML algorithms (given that such
properties do not easily lend themselves to such specifications). These techniques are only applicable
to well-specified deterministic or tractable systems that can be implemented using traditional methods
(e.g., the C programming language) or via ML models. As a consequence, these techniques cannot be
straightforwardly applied to arbitrary contexts, and domain-specific effort is currently required even to
specify properties of interest, let alone verify them.
Indeed, there is much progress to be made with regard to the verification of deep neural networks, but
formal verification can still be effectively utilised to reinforce non-ML software employed to construct
the ML model itself. For example, researchers have demonstrated a methodology in which developers
can use an interactive proof assistant to implement their ML system and prove formal theorems that their
implementation is free of errors [198]. Others have shown that overflow and underflow errors within
supporting software can propagate and affect the functionality of an ML model [199]. Additionally,
researchers have identified a number of different run-time errors using a traditional formal methods-
based static-analysis tool to analyze YOLO, a commonly used open source ML vision software [140].
Issues identified include:
100For example: functionality, performance, reliability, availability, security, etc.
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• A number of memory leaks, such as files opened and not closed, and temporarily allocated data
not freed, leading to unpredictable behavior, crashes, and corrupted data;
• A large number of calls to free where the validity of the returned data is not checked. This could
lead to incorrect (but potentially plausible) weights being loaded to the network;
• Potential "divide by zeros" in the training code. This could lead to crashes during online training,
if the system were to be used in such a way; and
• Potential floating-point "divide by zeros," some of which were located in the network cost calcula-
tion function. As noted above, this could be an issue during online training.
We note that many of the above errors are only applicable to languages such as C and C++ (i.e., statically
typed languages), and not Python, a language widely used in the implementation of numerous ML
libraries and frameworks. As a dynamically typed language, Python brings about a different set of
program errors not typically exhibited by statically typed languages (e.g., type errors). Unfortunately,
formal verification techniques for the analysis of Python code are inherently limited, with linters and
type checkers being the main available source of static analysis tools.
Though the Python situation differs from that encountered with C and C++, there are many ways that
potential faults arising from Python could affect the functionality of an ML model. This is a large gap
within the formal verification field that needs to be addressed immediately, given the deployment of
safety-critical AI systems, such as autonomous vehicles, utilizing Python. Previous research efforts101
[200] have attempted to formalise a subset of Python that would be amenable to verification; however,
it has been notoriously difficult to formalise and verify [201] dynamically typed languages. Although
optional static type hinting is now available for Python,102 "the Python runtime does not enforce function
and variable type annotations. [Hints] can be used by third party tools such as type checkers, IDEs,
linters, etc." Furthermore, it is unlikely that the ML community will constrain themselves to subsets of
Python which are statically-typed.103
Formal verification techniques have been widely deployed for traditional safety-critical systems (as re-
quired by IEC 61508) for several decades, and have more recently been adopted by some tech companies
for specific applications.104 However, the rapid introduction of machine learning in these environments
has posed a great challenge from both a regulatory and system assurance point of view. The lack of
applicable formal verification techniques for AI systems stifles the assurance avenues required to build
trust (i.e., regulations, verification, and validation), curbing the potential innovation and benefits to be
gained from their deployment. The following open research problems must thus be addressed to allow
formal verification to contribute to trust in AI development:
• Creation of specifications unique to AI, with corresponding mathematical frameworks, to con-
tribute to assurance of AI systems;
• Creation of novel formal verification techniques which can address the newly defined specifications
mentioned above; and
101See Python semantics: (https://github.com/kframework/python-semantics).
102See official Python documentation (https://docs.python.org/3/library/typing.html) and MyPy (h
ttps://github.com/python/mypy).
103See the discussion following the feature request in the TensorFlow codebase (https://github.com/tensorflo
w/tensorflow/issues/12345).
104See Infer, an open source static analyzer (https://fbinfer.com/).
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• Collaboration between ML and verification researchers resulting in deep learning systems that are
more amenable to verification [202].
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B Verifiable Data Policies in Distributed Computing Systems
Current IT systems do not provide a mechanism to enforce a data policy (e.g., sharing restrictions,
anonymity restrictions) on data that is shared with another party - individuals and organizations are
required to trust that the data will be used according to their preferences. Google’s Project Oak105
aims to address this gap, by providing a reference implementation of open source infrastructure for the
verifiably secure storage, processing, and exchange of any type of data.
With Oak, data is collected and used as it is today, but it is also accompanied by enforceable policies that
define appropriate access, collection, and use. Data is stored in encrypted enclaves and remote attes-
tation between enclaves ensures that only appropriate code ever gets direct access to the secured data
(i.e. within the limits of what can be verified and as defined by a configurable policy), and processing
of the data creates a verifiable record. In the long term, Google’s objective is to provide formal proofs
such that core properties of the system can be verified down to the hardware. Platforms that implement
this infrastructure could then form the bedrock of all sorts of other services from messaging, machine
learning, and identity management to operating system hosting, making meaningful control technically
feasible in a way that it is not today.
Oak uses enclaves and formal verification. Taken together, it is possible to verify that data is only pro-
cessed in a way that complies with a configurable policy that goes with it. In short, data lives in enclaves
and moves from one enclave to another only when the sending enclave is able to convince itself that the
receiving enclave will obey the policy that goes with the data and will itself perform the same verification
step before sending the data (or data derived from it) on to other enclaves. Movement outside enclaves
is only permitted when encrypted with keys available only to the enclave, or as allowed by policy (for
example, to show the data to specific people or when adequately anonymized, again specified by policy).
Oak combines formal verification and remote attestation with binary transparency. Oak is being devel-
oped entirely as an open source project - this is deliberate and necessary. Because Oak is open source,
even in the absence of formal proofs, any independent third party (whether an individual researcher,
regulatory body, or consumer advocacy group) can examine Oak’s source code and confirm that the im-
plementation matches the expected behavior. With the correctness of Oak confirmed insofar as possible,
a given Oak virtual machine needs to be able to attest that it is running the "correct" binary of Oak.
This attestation makes it possible for the client (or sending enclave) to assure itself that the requesting
enclave will follow any policies on the data, because it knows that the Oak policy enforcement system
is running on that enclave and is "truly" Oak - that is: matches the binary of Oak known from the open
source repository.
Usability and independent auditability are crucial to an Oak system’s utility. Four types of actors are
expected to interact with Oak:
• End users: people who will use Oak apps;
• Application developers: people who will build Oak apps;
• Policy authors: people who will define and manage the policies that accompany the data in an
Oak app;
105More detail on Oak’s technical aspects, including instructions for how to write programs targeting the current iteration of
Oak, can be found on the Oak GitHub repo: https://github.com/project-oak
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• Verifiers: people who will add credibility to an Oak app by verifying that the policy is upheld.
A user-centric design perspective points to many questions such as: What do people need to know about
an Oak app when making a decision about whether to use it? How will people understand the effective
policy an Oak app is bound by? Howwill people’s preferences be captured? Howwill we help people find
verifiers to delegate trust decisions to? If Oak apps and data policies change, or a verifier’s assessment
of a policy changes (which we expect can and will happen), how is this change communicated to the
people who need to know?
As important as it is to ensure end-users avoid critical mistakes and can understand the impact of Oak,
it is even more important to ensure developers are able to avoid critical mistakes when using Oak. This
requires deliberate design of how app makers will build, deploy, and debug.
An Oak node without a correct and useful policy is useless. Oak does not provide privacy by default,
it does so only if the policies specified are privacy-preserving. Thus, the user experience of specifying
and maintaining the policy that accompanies data is crucial to the successful use of Oak. Policy authors
will begin with a set of policy goals that will be refined into a natural language representation of a set
of rules and will likely be translated into a set of rules that can be enforced by an Oak node. The policy
language for those rules will need to be determined based on the types of protection that is relevant to
use cases and the rules that can be verifiably enforced. In some cases, there will be desirable attestations
that cannot be formally verified (e.g., non-commercial use). Depending on the context, policies may be
generated andmanaged by a group of people, sometimes the developer and sometimes a cross-functional
team from within a company.
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C Interpretability
What has interpretability research focused on?
Interpretability research includes work in areas such as explaining a specific prediction [203] [204] [205]
[206], explaining global model behavior [207] [195] [208] [209] [210], building more interpretable
models [211] [212] [208] [213] [214] [215] [216], interactive visualization tools for human explo-
ration [217] [218] [122] [219] [220], and analyzing functional sub-components of neural networks to
understandwhat they are doing [221]. These areas of work are characterized separately below, although
several overlap and interact with one another.
Explaining a specific prediction. Many techniques seek to explain a model’s prediction on some given
input. For example, onemight ask which part of the input–for imagemodels, this might take the form of a
heatmap over input pixels [222] [223] [224] [225] [226] [227] [228]–or which training examples [203]
[204] [205] [206] were responsible for the model’s prediction. By examining the model’s reasoning on
different input instances through these attribution methods, we can better decide whether or not to
trust the model: if a model, say, predicts that an image contains a wolf because of the snowy image
background and not because of any actual wolf features, then we can extrapolate that it is likely to
misclassify future images with snowy backgrounds [92].
Explaining global model behavior. Instead of explaining individual predictions, other techniques aim
to construct human-understandable representations of a model’s global behavior, so that users can more
directly interrogate what a model might do on different inputs rather than having to extrapolate from
explanations of previous predictions. Examples include approximating a complex model with a simpler,
more interpretable model (like a shallow decision tree) [207] [195] [229] [209] [210]; or characterizing
the role and contribution of internal components of a model (e.g., feature visualization or development
of geometric invariance) [223] [228] [86] [230] [231] [232] [233] [234] [235] [236].
Current directions in interpretability research
Buildingmore interpretable models. A separate but complementary line of work seeks to build models
that are constrained to be interpretable by design (as opposed to training a complex, hard-to-interpret
model and then attempting to analyze it post-hoc with one of the above techniques) [211] [212] [208]
[213] [214] [215] [216].
Interactive visualization tools for human exploration. A related research theme is the development
of tools that allow humans to interact with, modify, and explore an ML system (e.g., dashboards to
visualize model predictions and errors [217] [218]; explanations of model representations [219] [220]
[237] [238]; or directly interacting with an AI agent [122].106).
Software and tools for practitioners. Most interpretability tools that have been developed are best
used by ML researchers for interpretability research. A few software packages that are less research-
oriented allow novice users to better understand a dataset’s distribution and inspect a model interac-
tively;107 these packages primarily fall under the category of "interactive visualization tools." Moreover,
106Also see Google Quickdraw (https://quickdraw.withgoogle.com/) and Bach doodle (https://www.g
oogle.com/doodles/celebrating-johann-sebastian-bach).
107See What-if tool for ML model exploration (https://pair-code.github.io/what-if-tool/) and Facets
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most open-sourced code from interpretability research primarily focuses on the method being intro-
duced and rarely include standardized benchmarks and comparisons with related work, with some ex-
ceptions.108 We hope to see more software packages that empower novice users to use interpretability
techniques effectively as well as aid researchers by providing standardized benchmarks for comparing
methods. Lastly, much work is focused on interpretability at a particular scale (i.e., individual examples
vs. dataset distribution); we desire more work at connecting interpretability work along different axes
and scales [234].
for data exploration (https://pair-code.github.io/facets/).
108See saliency repository (/urlhttps://github.com/PAIR-code/saliency), InterpretML (https://github.com/inter
pretml/interpret), and TreeInterpreter (https://github.com/andosa/treeinterpreter).
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List of Recommendations for Reference
Institutional Mechanisms and Recommendations
1. A coalition of stakeholders should create a task force to research options for conducting and fund-
ing third party auditing of AI systems.
2. Organizations developing AI should run red teaming exercises to explore risks associated with
systems they develop, and should share best practices and tools for doing so.
3. AI developers should pilot bias and safety bounties for AI systems to strengthen incentives and
processes for broad-based scrutiny of AI systems.
4. AI developers should share more information about AI incidents, including through collaborative
channels.
Software Mechanisms and Recommendations
5. Standards setting bodies should work with academia and industry to develop audit trail require-
ments for safety-critical applications of AI systems.
6. Organizations developing AI and funding bodies should support research into the interpretability
of AI systems, with a focus on supporting risk assessment and auditing.
7. AI developers should develop, share, and use suites of tools for privacy-preserving machine
learning that include measures of performance against common standards.
Hardware Mechanisms and Recommendations
8. Industry and academia should work together to develop hardware security features for AI ac-
celerators or otherwise establish best practices for the use of secure hardware (including secure
enclaves on commodity hardware) in machine learning contexts.
9. One or more AI labs should estimate the computing power involved in a single project in great
detail (high-precision compute measurement), and report on the potential for wider adoption
of such methods.
10. Government funding bodies should substantially increase funding of computing power resources
for researchers in academia, in order to improve the ability of those researchers to verify claims
made by industry.
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